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In a recent Article in the Cornell Law Review, Professor James
A. Martin asserted that due process concepts do not provide an
adequate theoretical basis for constitutional limitations on choice of
law, nor do they sufficiently explain the results in the Supreme
Court decisions purporting to apply to those concepts.' He states
that constitutional analysis of this problem should proceed from
the full faith and credit clause, and focus on the competing in-
terests of the jurisdictions involved. Thus, without making clear
whether he is referring to the law as it is (what the Supreme Court
* I am grateful for helpful comments by my colleague Harold W. Horowitz, who does
not fully agree with the approach taken here.
t Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. B.A. 1957, Yale University;
L.L.B. 1960, University of California, Berkeley.
1 Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 185 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Martin].
LIMITATIONS ON CHOICE OF LAW
has done, even though it may not have said so), or to the law as it
should be, he concludes:
The forum may apply it4 law to the substantive questions of
a case whenever (a) the party resisting application of that law has
acted in the forum or derived from the forum relatively direct
benefits, or (b) there is some weaker connection between the
defendant and the forum, and the forum's interests are relatively
strong compared to interests of other states that would be dis-
served by the application of forum law. 2
The implication, of course, is that if neither (a) nor (b) is met, the
forum may not apply its own law. I doubt that this either accurately
reflects what the Supreme Court has done or formulates the law
as it should be.3
DUE PROCESS
A. Power and Fairness
Professor Martin has treated due process exclusively as a fair-
ness doctrine, arguing that it is too elusive a tool for choice-of-law
questions when formulated in terms of avoiding unfair surprise or
of effectuating a party's justified reliance on a body of law. 4 Due
process, of course, does reflect fundamental notions of fairness,
particularly in its procedural context. But fairness is not its only
procedural aspect, nor is due process solely a procedural doctrine.
In its procedural form, the personal jurisdiction cases demonstrate
that due process has a power element as well as a fairness element.
Jurisdictional restrictions
2 Id. at 230.
3 The present discussion, like Professor Martin's, does not focus on privileges and im-
munities, equal protection, or the commerce clause as constitutional choice-of-law limita-
tions. A comprehensive treatment of the subject could not ignore those doctrines. As
courts adopt more "modern" choice-of-law rules stressing domicile and forum law, the role
of these constitutional doctrines as choice-of-law restraints will increase. See Currie &
Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws: Equal Protection, 28 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1 (1960); Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws:
Privileges and Immunities, 69 YALE L.J. 1323 (1960); Horowitz, The Commerce Clause as a
Limitation on State Choice of Law Doctrine, 84 HARv. L. REV. 806 (1971); cf. Sedler, Interstate
Accidents and the Unprovided For Case: Reflections on Neumeier v. Kuehner, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV.
125, 148-49 (1973).
4 Martin, supra note 1, at 188-91.
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are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or
distant litigation. They are a consequence of territorial limita-
tions on the power of the respective States. However minimal the
burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may not
be called upon to do so unless he has had the "minimal contacts"
with that State that are a prerequisite to its exercise of power
over him.5
Similarly, substantive due process restricts the ability of a state
to tax or to impose tax collection responsibilities, when it tries to
reach persons or transactions outside its borders.6 In this context,
too, the doctrine reflects a concern not only with fairness, but also
with the arrogation of power by a single geopolitical entity within
the United States. Acquisitiveness should have some limits wholly
apart from whether the persons affected might have expected it, or
whether interstate commerce might be unduly burdened by it, or
whether some other state would be more interested in the matter.
The catchword often used in the taxation cases is "nexus"-denot-
ing the requirement that there be some genuine link between the
state and the taxpayer to justify the state's exercise of the power to
tax or to require collection of a tax.7
Arrogation of power might be thought a less serious problem
when a state assumes authority to supply a rule of decision for
private litigation than when it assumes authority to hear a dispute
or to impose a tax. But a considerable exercise of power is involved
in asserting authority to attach one's own normative standard to
specific persons or events. We ought to be reasonably certain that
the state has some basis for exerting this power. This is distinct
- Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958). See also International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). As Professor Kurland said after Hanson: "[T]he concept
of territorial limitations on state power is still a vital one." Kurland, The Supreme Court, the
Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts-From Pennoyer to Denckla: A
Review, 25 U. Cm. L. REV. 569, 623 (1958).
6 Substantive due process has been recently applied by the Supreme Court to limit the
power of a state to impose tax collection obligations on a nonresident. See National Bellas
Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967). See also Aldens, Inc. v. Packel,
524 F.2d 38, 42-44 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Aldens, Inc. v. Kane, 96 S. Ct. 1684
(1976) (due process as choice-of-law restriction).
'See, e.g., Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 464
(1959); Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 445 (1940); cf. National Bellas Hess,
Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756-58 (1967). The power element appears
clearly in Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954): "[D]ue process re-
quires some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person,
property or transaction it seeks to tax." See also Griffin, Inc. v. Tully, 404 F. Supp. 738,
748 (D. Vt. 1975).
[Vol. 62:94
LIMITATIONS ON CHOICE OF LAW
from our concern that the state should treat individuals fairly,8 and
also distinct from our concern (expressed in the full faith and
credit clause) that the specific interests of other states be respected.
In all cases, a minimum, threshold justification for asserting nor-
mative authority should exist before we ask whether it is unfair, or
invades another state's interest, to exercise the power.
If this is a legitimate due process concern, one must ask what
gives a state authority to impose its normative standard. Arguably,
the focus should be on the state's interest in effectuating the
policies reflected in its rule by applying the rule to the facts before
it-an interest-analysis standard. 9 Unfortunately, the legislative and
common-law policies underlying specific rules are very often unar-
ticulated; hence, courts applying interest analysis often speculate
and, one sometimes suspects, engage in some creative juggling of
policies to reach the desired xesult. To the extent that this process
favors choosing forum law, as it generally does, a due process
power limitation should curb any excesses. The power limitation
cannot do so unless it is based on relatively observable facts that
establish a link between the state and the persons or transactions to
be governed by its rule. Because states are defined territorially, and
because most people are comfortable with the proposition that it is
a state's legitimate business to attach rules to matters or persons
having a genuine connection with its territory, a power limitation
based on territoriality makes sense. If the rule the state seeks to
impose applies to an event within the state's territory, or to a per-
son who has some relatively stable relationship with the state (such as
residence, domicile, or place of business), an observable link exists to
justify the exercise of power. The cases support such a due process
power standard as a complement to the fairness standard.
B. The Leading Due Process Cases
Home Insurance Company v. Dick:"° A fire insurance policy, is-
sued in Mexico by a Mexican insurance agency to a Mexican
domiciliary, covered a tug while it was in designated Mexican wa-
ters. The policy was expressly made subject to Mexican law, the
premium was paid in Mexico, and the loss was "payable in the City
8 The traditional fairness standard is that it ought not surprise the persons affected or
impose undue burdens on them.
9 See Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial
Function, 26 U. CHI. L. REv. 9, 43-44, 75-76 (1958), reprinted in B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWs 232-33, 271 (1963).
10 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
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of Mexico in current funds of the United States of Mexico, or their
equivalent elsewhere."'" The loss was payable to Dick (who was not
the original holder of the policy) and the Texas and Gulf Steam-
ship Company, as their interests might appear. The policy pro-
vided that no suit could be brought under it after one year from
the date of the loss, as permitted by Mexican law. Before any loss
occurred, the policy was assigned to Dick, a Mexican resident,
though a Texas domiciliary. He remained a Mexican resident until
after the tug was destroyed by fire. More than a year after the loss,
he sued on the policy in a Texas court, relying on a Texas statute
that invalidated any provision limiting the time for suit to less than
two years. Jurisdiction was obtained by garnishment against the
Texas agents of two New York insurance companies that had rein-
sured the loss by arrangement with the Mexican company.
The United States Supreme Court stressed that the Texas
statute attempted to regulate contractual rights and obligations;
hence, it was not a mere statute of limitations. Since Texas had no
contact with the transaction except as the assignee's domicile, it was
held to be "without power"' 2 to affect the terms of the contract:
Its attempt to impose a greater obligation than that agreed upon
and to seize property in payment of the imposed obligation vi-
olates the guaranty against deprivation of property without due
process of law.'"
The full faith and credit clause was not involved, because Mexico
was not a state within the meaning of that clause.
Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp. :14 An insurance pol-
icy, negotiated and issued in Massachusetts, and delivered in Mas-
sachusetts and Illinois, insured the Toni Company against liability
arising from the use of its hairwaving product. The policy covered
losses from personal injuries to Toni users anywhere in the United
States, its territories, or Canada. It contained a provision, valid in
1Id. at 403.
12 Id. at 408.
1 2Id. In view of this language (and of the literal wording of the due process clause), it
might be argued that the holding is limited to cases in which there is an actual garnish-
ment, attachment, or execution against property. If that were the case, due process would
not be a constraint applied to choice-of-law itself, but to choice-of-law plus property seizure
under court order. Such a reading of Dick, however, seems too narrow in light of the
broader use of due process in the personal jurisdiction context, and in light of the direct
or prospective effect on property when the forum makes a choice of law imposing or
denying liability.
14 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
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Massachusetts and Illinois, barring direct action against the insur-
ance company until final determination of Toni's liability. A Lou-
isiana resident who had used the product in Louisiana sued the
insurance company in Louisiana under that state's direct-action
statute, without any prior determination that Toni was liable. The
United States Supreme Court held that Louisiana could apply its
direct-action statute consistently with due process. The Court said
that in Dick
Texas was denied power to alter the terms of an insurance con-
tract made in Mexico between persons then in that country, cov-
ering a vessel only while in Mexican waters, and containing a
provision that the contract was to be governed by the laws of
Mexico. Thus, the subject matter of the contract related in no
manner to anything that had been done or was to be done in
Texas. For this reason, Texas was denied power to alter the obli-
gations of the Mexican contract. But this Court carefully pointed
out that its decision might have been different had activities re-
lating to the contract taken place in Texas upon which the State
could properly lay hold as a basis for regulation. 15
Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. :16 A person then residing in
Illinois purchased a "Personal Property Floater Policy (World
Wide)" containing no territorial limits on coverage and containing
no choice-of-law clause. The policy contained a one-year limitation
of action clause, which was valid under Illinois law. After moving
to Florida, the insured lost his personal property. Under Florida
law, the one-year limitation clause was invalid. The United States
Supreme Court held that Florida did not violate due process by
applying its own law. Dick was distinguished on the ground that
"activities" in Texas were "wholly lacking"17 whereas in Clay, Flo-
rida had "ample contacts with the present transaction and the
parties."'18
C. Synthesis
The common threads running through these three decisions
are: (1) the search for a more-than-minimal contact or relationship
1Id. at 71 (emphasis added).
16 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
17Id. at 181-82.
" Id. at 183. The Court also distinguished Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine
Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934), on the ground that the forum state activities in that case
were thought to be too slight and too casual to justify application of forum law. Delta & Pine
was not distinguishable on its facts. See note 59 infra.
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with the forum state to justify assertion of that state's power to
allocate rights and revise obligations in ways contrary to those
agreed upon by the parties; and (2) the attempt to find some as-
surance that the party who stands to lose under the chosen law has
assumed the risk that contacts or relationships sufficient to satisfy
the power requirement might take place in that state.19 The result-
ing standard-power tempered by fairness-is fundamentally a
due process standard. 20
If one leaves power out of the due process equation, as Profes-
sor Martin does, then the concept of fairness to individual parties,
absent further definition, does not provide predictable, principled
standards for choice-of-law determinations. The only standard left
is deference to the interests of other states or nations-essentially a
full faith and credit standard, extended by analogy when the other
sovereign is a nation. To demonstrate this, Professor Martin pre-
sents two cases: Skiriotes v. Florida21 and Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino.22
In Skiriotes, the Supreme Court held that Florida could apply
its criminal sanction against those using certain equipment to take
sponges from more than three nautical miles off the Florida coast,
when the defendant was a Florida citizen engaged in a Florida-
centered business of deep sea diving for commercial sponges. The
significant difference between this holding and Dick, Professor
Martin asserts, is that the high seas locus of the activities in Skiriotes
eliminates the foreign contacts present in Dick, but does not add
significant domestic contacts. 23 Skiriotes does eliminate the foreign
contacts, but it is something of a mystery why the defendant's
Florida residence and Florida business (to say nothing of the con-
tinuum of the sponge fishery within, as well as outside, the three
mile limit) do not add significant domestic contacts to the Dick
19 The decisions do not support the argument that the explanation for the due process
decisions is the interest of the forum in applying its own law. See text accompanying notes
39-43 infra.
20 Professor Martin asserts that the attribution of importance to the location of events
is linked to state sovereignty over the events-which he identifies with full faith and credit
rather than with due process. Martin, supra note 1, at 200. But full faith and credit relates
to avoidance of excessive legal provincialism in a federal system, not to state sovereignty
over events. See text accompanying notes 60-62 infra.
The Dick case, with its due process rationale, has never been seriously questioned in
subsequent Supreme Court decisions, though it has been distinguished in cases like Watson
(377 U.S. at 182), and Clay (348 U.S. at 70-71).
2! 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
22 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
23 Martin, supra note 1, at 197.
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situation.24 Moreover, to view the Skiriotes case as Professor Martin
does ignores the fact that the Supreme Court stressed that it was
dealing with a question of state power-a due process concept-in
the context of a state's extraterritorial reach.25
Professor Martin then turns to Sabbatino, correctly treating it as
a choice-of-law decision. In effect, the Supreme Court applied the
act-of-state doctrine as a "super choice-of-law rule" which (1) chose
Cuban law to determine the validity of the Cuban taking in Cuban
waters of sugar beneficially owned by Americans; (2) conclusively
presumed the taking valid under Cuban law; and (3) precluded
application of the public policy escape device that might have pre-
vented Banco Nacional from relying on Cuban law in an American
court.2 6 It is true, as Professor Martin states, that the taking would
have violated due process had it been perpetrated by the United
States government, and that the Cuban taking at least runs counter
to the "spirit" of due process.2 7 One can only wonder, however,
how that leads to the statement:
Thus, it perverts the concept of due process to hold that the fifth
amendment's due process clause actually required the holding in
Sabbatino on the ground that Cuba was the only country with the
requisite contacts. 28
Surely due process did not require the holding in Sabbatino on
that ground or any other. The Supreme Court never implied that it
did. It based its holding on the apprehension that any other result
might interfere with the handling of foreign affairs by the Execu-
tive Branch, and on a feeling that it would be improper for the
world's largest capital-exporting nation to apply its own legal stan-
dards, inevitably considered parochial by some nations, to judge
the propriety of expropriation by third world countries. 29 Neither
basis rests on due process premises.
Under Dick, Watson, and Clay, an American court could have
decided against Banco Nacional without violating due process, for
at least two reasons: (1) Were it not for the act-of-state doctrine
(which has little or nothing to do with due process), an American
24 See Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 75-79 (1941).
25 Id. at 79.
2See generally Henkin, Act of State Today: Recollections in Tranquility, 6 CoLuaf. J. OF
TRANSNAT'L L. 175 (1967); Kirgis, Act of State Exceptions and Choice of Law, 44 U. COLO. L.
REV. 173 (1972).
27 Martin, supra note 1, at 198.
2 8 Id. (emphasis in original).
29 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423-25, 427-37 (1964).
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court could have resorted to the public policy escape device, simply
refusing to enforce the Cuban plaintiff's claim for affirmative
relief.30 In Dick, the Supreme Court left the door open for just
that.31 (2) The beneficial owners of the expropriated sugar were
Americans, and the expropriation was in retaliation for United
States policies toward Cuba. After the expropriation, the Cuban
governmental instrumentality resold the sugar to the original
American buyer and sent the documents of title to an agent in the
United States for delivery to the buyer. Consequently there were
many contacts with the United States, and it would not seem unfair
to hold that the Cuban government assumed the risk that federal
law in the United States might apply when it expropriated and
resold the sugar. Only foreign policy considerations prevented the
application of American law. 32
D. Due Process Formulation
It is important to state just what limits due process provides. I
do so with some diffidence especially since Dick was decided within
a choice-of-law system that has been increasingly abandoned.
Nevertheless, the guidelines below are offered, not only as a syn-
thesis of the due process limits reflected in existing decisions, but
also as workable standards for future cases. They incorporate no-
tions of power as well as fairness. I have drawn in part on Profes-
sor Martin's perception that derivation of benefits from the forum
may give it sufficient justification to apply its own law, although I
would not apply the "benefits" test exactly as he would.3 3
Moreover, this derivation of benefits from the forum standard
seems to go to due process fairness, not (as Professor Martin
argues34) to full faith and credit.
30 Banco Nacional was the plaintiff, seeking to recover for conversion of the docu-
ments of title to the sugar. Id. at 406.
31 Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 410 (1930). It has been pointed out that the
public policy refuge is often just an application of forum law in disguise. See Paulsen &
Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 969 (1956). But this is not
necessarily the case when the forum simply refuses to enforce an affirmative claim based
on a foreign law that is repugnant to the forum's fundamental notions of justice or moral-
ity, as would be the case in Sabbatino.
32 As Professor Martin notes, Congress in the second Hickenlooper Amendment, 22
U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1970), reversed the Sabbatino result on the narrow facts of the case.
The ensuing due process attack on the Hickenlooper Amendment was not made on
choice-of-law grounds. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968).
11 Compare Martin, supra note 1, at 207-08, with text accompanying note 58 infra.
34 Martin, supra note 1, at 203.
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The forum must have a reasonable basis for applying its own
law. 35 Specifically, a reasonable due process basis exists to provide
the rule for a specific issue in a dispute, whether or not the forum
has an interest (in the interest-analysis sense) in applying its own
law, only if:
(1) Any transaction, conduct, or occurrence closely connected
with the claim for relief or defense on that issue has taken place in
the forum, or the party resisting application of forum law has some
nonminimal relationship with the forum that is reflected in the
content or policy of the forum's rule;36 and
(2) application of forum law would not be manifestly unfair to
the party resisting it. Manifest unfairness exists when the resisting
party has not done anything (personally or by an agent) in the
forum to which the specific forum rule attaches significance, if the
rule would adversely affect substantial interests of that party pro-
tected by a conflicting rule in another relevant jurisdiction, 37 and
if:
(a) the issue arises from a transaction or conduct from which
the resisting party expected to receive some material benefit, but
no substantial part of the actual or anticipated benefit is derived
(or could reasonably be expected to be derived) from sources or
occurrences within the forum or, perhaps, from a state having
substantially the same rule as the forum; or
(b) no material benefit was expected, and the resisting party
would not have reasonably foreseen that any of the "power" condi-
35 Although due process restrictions could apply even when the forum applies a law
other than its own, the temptations are far greater to stretch the reach of the forum's own
law than to strain to apply the law of some other jurisdiction. Consequently the discussion
in the text concentrates on choice of forum law.
36 Instances of such a nonminimal relationship would include domicile or residence in
the forum, when the issue relates to such things as personal status or intrafamilial matters
or the economic interests of the state's domiciliaries or residents in general; ownership or
operation of a business establishment in the forum, when the issue concerns the business;
and conduct connected with the matter at issue and carried on elsewhere, either with a
focus specifically on the forum (e.g., a scheme to defraud forum residents, or an au-
tomobile trip begun elsewhere with the forum as its destination), or conduct with a more
general focus that clearly includes the forum in more than an incidental sense (e.g., a
nationwide advertising campaign).
37 Examples of conduct to which a forum rule attaches significance would include
making a contract, when the forum rule establishes the consequences of a contractual rela-
tionship; acting in a way the forum considers negligent; executing a trust instrument which
the forum treats as testamentary; or creating a corporation, when the forum rule regulates
internal corporate affairs.
A "relevant jurisdiction" is one with any of the traditional contacts or one with an in-
terest in the application of its law to the specific facts.
1976]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:94
tions (as set out in paragraph (1) supra) would be met in the forum
or, perhaps, in a state having substantially the same rule as the
forum.
(c) Even if there is an actual or anticipated benefit derived
from the forum (or an arguably foreseeable contact with it under
(b) supra), if the severity of the forum rule is out of all proportion to
the benefit derived from the forum by the affected party (or if the
forum rule is severe and the foreseeability of the forum contact
under (b) is debatable), it would be manifestly unfair to apply the
forum's rule.38
E. Explanation
The existence of a forum governmental interest in applying its
own law to the specific facts is neither a necessary nor a sufficient
condition for the satisfaction of due process requirements. Tradi-
tional doctrine purported to ignore such things. The Supreme
Court's most recent pronouncement on choice of law sanctioned
the ultimate choice of the (nonforum) law of the place of wrong
-the site of an airline crash-even though that state had no ap-
parent interest in the application of its law.39 Conversely, in Dick
the Supreme Court struck down application of forum law on due
process grounds, even though the forum had an interest in apply-
ing its own rule.40
38 In order to avoid highly subjective and indeterminate balancing exercises under the
banner of due process, this principle should be applied only when the disproportion is
obvious.
'9 Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962). The Court's dictum said in part:
Where more than one State has sufficiently substantial contact with the activity in
question, the forum State, by analysis of the interests possessed by the States in-
volved, could constitutionally apply to the decision of the case the law of one or
another state having such an interest in the multistate activity.
Id. at 15. The outcome shows that the Court did not have governmental interest analysis
specifically in mind, or at least had not thought carefully about it. This is suggested also by
the Court's reference to a state's "interest in the multistate activity" rather than to its in-
terest in effectuating the policies underlying its own law-the latter being the concern of
interest analysis. For discussion of Richards under the fairness test proposed in the text, see
note 179 infra.
See also R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 388 (1971) (acknowl-
edging that application of forum law without a governmental interest does not violate due
process under current doctrine).
40 Texas had an interest in applying its rule to protect Dick at all relevant times, since
he was first a nonresident Texas domiciliary and later a resident domiciliary.
Language in Aldens, Inc. v. Packel, 524 F.2d 38, 43 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub.
nom. Aldens, Inc. v. Kane, 96 S. Ct. 1684 (1976), suggests that a substantial forum interest
would satisfy due process objections. On its facts, Aldens would clearly meet both aspects of
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Interest analysis developed relatively recently, at least insofar
as it represents a judicially-articulated method for choice of law.
Although it can be relevant to due process assessment (an in-
terested forum is less likely to be reaching beyond reasonable limits
than a noninterested forum),41 it invites too much judicial specula-
tion to be a dependable due process test.42 In any event, its unique
focus on governmental policies and interests raises issues more
directly the concern of the full faith and credit clause. 43
To return to the specific standards proposed above, it will be
apparent that the first-relating to contacts with, or relationship of
the resisting party to, the forum-concerns the power rationale.
The contacts or relationships envisaged by it would provide the
essential due process nexus, even if in a particular case they would
not result in applying forum law under a traditional choice-of-law
rule.4 4 The function of the nexus is not to supply a due process
choice-of-law rule for all cases, but to insure that a state has suffi-
cient contacts with a claim or defense to justify the application of its
own rule of decision. Thus in Watson and Clay, even though the
issue might have been characterized as the validity of a contractual
provision and the place of contracting might have determined what
law to apply, the occurrence of the insured-against harm in the
forum would provide the required nexus for application of forum
the due process test proposed in this Article, without having to rely on the forum's interest
in applying its own law.
"' See Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 72 (1954).
42 See text following note 9 supra.
43 See text accompanying notes 111-32 infra. Compare Sedler, The Territorial Imperative:
Automobile Accidents and the Significance of a State Line, 9 DuQ. L. REv. 394, 403 (1971), with
the formulation proposed above. Sedler rejects physical contacts as a necessary condition
for applying forum law, and says that
the forum may apply its own law on the ground that the plaintiff is a resident of
that state where: (1) the fact of residency gives it an interest in applying its law on
the issue as to which a conflict exists, and (2) the application of its law does not
produce fundamental unfairness or defeat the legitimate expectations of the other
party.
Id. at 403 (emphasis omitted). Presumably, Professor Sedler's proposed standard takes into
account full faith and credit as well as due process considerations. If this assumption is
correct, there seems to be no irreconcilable inconsistency between his approach and that
taken in this Article. However, Professor Sedler's approach lacks the specificity necessary
for a standard to have useful predictive power.
44 Cf. Cheatham, Federal Control of Conflict of Laws, 6 VAND. L. REv. 581, 601-02 (1953);
Leflar, Constitutional Limits on Free Choice of Law, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 706, 726-27
(1963). As the second (fairness) half of my proposed formulation makes clear, nexus alone
does not satisfy due process. The early cases stressing only traditional contacts for due
process purposes, such as New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918), have
been overruled sub silentio.
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law. Dick had no such nexus, unless the presence of the reinsurers
supplied it. However, the Court ignored their presence when dis-
cussing due process rights, and they had no direct involvement in
the matters at issue. 45
The truly difficult task is defining the fairness standard. One
must explain the leading cases and supply a normative test that is
both useful in deciding most or all future cases and consistent with
widely shared American values. On the latter point, most would
agree that receipt of a benefit would justify the imposition of a
roughly commensurate legal burden. This fairness standard re-
flects the pervasive notion in our society that exchange is benefi-
cial. To the extent that a choice-of-law fairness standard can ap-
proximate that-exchanging benefits derived from sources within
a state for the possible burden of an adverse legal rule directly
related to those benefits-it reflects and even reinforces that posi-
tive norm in the society. 46 Moreover, a court can apply such a test
to cases in which the parties seek some material benefit, since the
sources of any actual or anticipated benefits can usually be ascer-
tained.
Of course, not all cases involve transactions in which a material
benefit has been sought. Take, for example, the case of the dog
straying from its owner's yard in a "one bite" state to bite the
plaintiff just across the border in an "absolute liability" state. Since
the owner sought no "benefit," some other fairness test must be
used. Although no workable test appears to have quite the virtues
of the benefit test (in the sense that we can agree on the direct
correlation between benefit and burden), most would agree that
the proposed test-foreseeability of the contact-will at least pre-
vent the most serious unfairness. If a person cannot reasonably
foresee that his conduct or his relationships will touch a particular
4- Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 407-08 (1930). See also the explanation of Dick
in Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 71 (1954).
16 The due process test in cases involving state taxation of interstate commerce is often
formulated in terms of granting taxing authority to the state if the taxpayer derives ben-
efits from it. See National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753,
756-58 (1967); Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940). The Supreme
Court, however, has not always clearly distinguished the benefit test from the minimum
contacts (power) test. See, e.g., National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386
U.S. 753, 758 (1967). But see id. at 765-66 (Fortas, J., dissenting opinion).
The fairness aspect of due process for purposes of personal jurisdiction has also been
phrased in terms of exchanging jurisdictional burdens for benefits obtained from the state.
See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Ap-
paratewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1143-44 (7th Cir. 1975); Gray v. American Radiator & Stan-
dard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
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state, one cannot expect him to tailor the conduct or relationships
to take account of that state's law. Even if in practice he would not
be inclined to engage in that sort of tailoring, he ought at least to
have the option. Conversely, if he has had the option (because the
contact or relationship was foreseeable), holding him to the adverse
rule usually will not seem unfair.
It might seem that the "foreseeable contact with the forum"
test would be a useful surrogate for the benefit test, since there
would normally be an actual or anticipated benefit from the forum
when the foreseeable contact test is met. However, it does not
appear to operate fairly in all cases involving economic benefits.
For example, if the parties to a business transaction define their
performance to exclude any possible benefit from certain states,
even if parties might have foreseen contact with an excluded state,
applying the excluded state's outcome-determinative rule to the
transaction would work an injustice if the parties neither foresaw
nor realized a benefit from the contact.47
The "manifest unfairness" standard does not expressly appear
in the Dick opinion in anything like the form outlined above.
Nevertheless, the benefit test complements the contact test to ex-
plain the result. The Court clearly referred to concepts of fairness
in stressing that Texas had not merely applied a forum statute of
limitations, to matters arising elsewhere, but had attempted to
change the parties' obligations under a contract.48 Essentially, it
was unfair to increase that obligation by applying Texas law when
there were neither contacts with Texas, nor benefits derived from
Texas sources. A Mexican company issued the insurance policy to a
Mexican resident. It was carefully drawn to cover only Mexican
losses, was expressly made subject to Mexican law, and provided
that the insurer pay for any loss in Mexico City. Thus, these factors
conclusively indicate that the insurer could obtain no benefit in the
form of increased premium or competitive advantage from any
Texas coverage. If coverage had extended beyond Mexican waters
and if there had been some possibility that the insured might have
47 Professor Martin has given an example of such a case. See Martin, supra note 1, at
210-11. It is discussed in Part III infra.
48 Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 409 (1930). The Court probably went further
than it would today in suggesting that there was a critical due process distinction between
the case before it and one involving two statutes of limitations without a contractual limita-
tion period. The point is that the Court did have a fairness concept in mind. The problem
is to translate it into terms relevant to a system in which the substance-procedure distinc-
tion and the inviolability of contract have diminished roles.
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taken the vessel to Texas waters, the insurer could have charged a
higher premium, thereby obtaining a Texas-related benefit.49
Professor Weintraub has pointed out that the policy made the
loss payable to "the Texas Gulf Steamship Company of Galveston,
Texas, and C. J. Dick, as their respective interests may appear. '50
Dick claimed that this located contract performance in Texas,
which, if true, would have given the insurer a benefit derived from
Texas. The Court, however, noted that the policy stated the in-
surer would pay claims in Mexico and added: "Nothing [under the
reinsurance contracts] was to be done, or was in fact done, in
Texas."'5 1 Consequently, the insurer derived no actual or foresee-
able benefit from Texas sources, based on the loss-payable clause.
The more usual characterization of the Dick result stresses the
unfair surprise to the insurer when the Texas courts applied Texas
law. Professor Weintraub originally viewed Dick as an "unfair sur-
prise" case, but altered his position upon discovering the express
designation in the policy of a Texas beneficiary and upon finding
that the insurer had a right to, and did, consent to the assignment
of the policy to Dick.52 But characterizing Dick as a no-contact,
no-benefit case renders it irrelevant to ask whether application of
Texas law unduly surprised the insurer.53 The key is the insurer's
attempt to localize the transaction in Mexico, without receiving any
actual or potential benefit from Texas; it would be manifestly un-
fair to apply Texas law to undo a perfectly valid (in Mexico) con-
tractual provision, even if the insurer somehow could have
foreseen that Texas law might ultimately be applied to some as-
pects of the transaction. 54
41 See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179, 182 (1964), quoting Clay v. Sun Ins.
Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 221 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting opinion); Watson v. Employers
Liab. Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 71 (1954).
50 R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 39, at 385. See also Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397,
403 n.2 (1930).
"' Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 404 (1930).
52 Compare Weintraub, Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Limitations on a State's Choice
of Law, 44 IOWA L. REv. 449, 455 (1959), with R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 39, at 385.
5' Irrelevant or not, I disagree with Professor Weintraub about the likelihood of real
surprise to the insurer when Texas law was applied. Everything about the policy except the
designation of the beneficiaries was focused on Mexico. Texas did not have personal juris-
diction over the Mexican insurer. Home Insurance obtained reinsurance with two New
York companies, not with Texas companies. It is most unlikely that the Mexican insurer
could reasonably have foreseen that its obligations might be brought before a Texas forum
simply because the insured could garnish the reinsurer's assets in Texas at the time of the
ultimate suit. Clearly, no other forum-certainly not a Mexican one-would have applied
the Texas statute extending the contractual limitation period.
'4 The suggested rationale also avoids the question of whether there was such detri-
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Formulating the fairness aspect of the due process test in
terms of benefits actually or foreseeably derived from the forum
comports with the facts and result in Dick, and avoids the circuitous
process of trying to decide what law a party could reasonably ex-
pect to control any aspect of a transaction or event. Questions of
foreseeability remain, but they focus on events and relationships,
not the foreseeability of a state's law being applied. Thus, one
avoids inquiries into the extent of the parties' legal sophistication
or the identification of factors that lead laypersons to believe they
might be subject to one legal system or another. 55
It remains to be shown that the suggested characterization of
Dick can survive the Supreme Court's liberality toward forum law
in Watson and Clay. Those cases also involved provisions in insur-
ance policies valid in the state where the contract was made, but
abrogated by forum law. Unlike the policy in Dick, which covered
only losses in certain Mexican waters, the policies in those cases
expressly covered losses anywhere in the United States. The Watson
mental reliance on the contractual limitation period that the application of the Texas stat-
ute would be unfair. Professor Martin has concluded that any such reliance "was probably
not detrimental." Martin, supra note 1, at 189. However, insertion of a locally valid, short
limitation period in its contracts probably enabled the insurer to charge somewhat smaller
premiums than if its exposure to suit lasted substantially longer. This would occur not only
because the insurer would avoid liability and the cost of defending some claims upon expi-
ration of the shorter period, but because shortening the time the insurer must hold liquid
reserves to cover doubtful or disputed claims would minimize administrative costs and
foregone investment opportunities. Cf. Hearings on Federal Malpractice Insurance Act, 1975,
Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 472, 494 (1975) (prepared statements of American Mut. Ins. Alliance and American
Ins. Ass'n); Report of the Professional Liability Committee, 43 INS. COUNSEL J. 207, 209-10 (1976)
(medical malpractice insurance an imperfect analogy because of greater uncertainty as to
amount and validity of a claim after the occurrence than in the case of casualty insurance).
"5 Because of the difficulty of extracting a workable "expectation of choice of law" test
from Dick, some leading commentators have resorted to vague and one-dimensional char-
acterizations of the case. See, e.g., R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 39, at 386:
[T]he application of Texas law violated due process because the contacts that
Texas had with the parties and with the transaction were not sufficient to make it
reasonable for Texas to enforce the policies underlying the Texas law.
Leflar stated:
The outer limit on constitutionality that [Dick] suggests is that no state may create
(or destroy) substantive claims by determining them under the law of a state which
has no substantial connection with the transaction ....
Leflar, supra note 44, at 717. See also R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAw 134-35 (1968);
Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9 (1971). Professor Leflar discounts the
idea that a formula with greater specificity than "substantial connection" or "fair play and
substantal justice" would have sufficient flexibility to cover all cases. Leflar, The Converging
Limits of State Jurisdictional Powers, 9 J. PUBLIC L. 282, 292 (1960).
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decision pointed out this distinction, 56 and although the brief opin-
ion in Clay did not mention the coverage restriction in Dick, it did
stress the worldwide scope of coverage in the insurance policy
under consideration. 57 By expressly insuring against losses in the
United States without geographic limitation, the insurers obtained
a benefit from each state in which the insured might suffer a loss.
Since the increased geographic scope of coverage raised the value
of the policy to the insured, the insurer could charge a higher
premium or secure a more competitive position against other
insurers.58 Consequently, it was fair to subject the insurers to the
law of any state to which coverage extended, as long as those laws
were not so severe as to impose burdens greatly disproportionate
to the benefits. Moreover, because the insured-against risk actually
occurred in the forum in each of those cases, the due process
power rationale was satisfied.59
II
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
A. The Limits of Provincialism
The full faith and credit clause primarily serves to prevent
excessive provincialism in legal matters among states in a federal
system.6 0 Some provincialism is inevitable. It would be futile, or at
least not worth the resources expended, to try to eradicate it all.
Consequently, the clause serves its purpose if it prevents a state
from using its legal system to interfere with the nation's multistate
56 Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 71-72 (1954).
57 Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179, 182 (1964).
58 Professor Martin notes that in Clay the insured paid a lump-sum premium before
moving to Florida, and appears to conclude that consequently the insurer derived no direct
benefits from Florida. Martin, supra note 1, at 212 n.87. Although receipt of premiums
from Florida would have met the benefits test, other benefits would also suffice. The
insurer's exchange of Florida-inclusive coverage for an economic return clearly constitutes
a benefit attributable to that state. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
59 This analysis confirms the Supreme Court's hints that Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.
v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934), is no longer good law. See Clay v. Sun Ins.
Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179, 181-82 (1964); Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348
U.S. 66, 71 (1954). The insurance contract in Delta & Pine covered losses "anywhere," and
the loss occurred in the forum. Under present due process standards, the forum could apply
its law abrogating the insurance contract's limitation period.
60 See Martin, supra note 1, at 193-94 (emphasis added). For historical discussion of the
clause, see Nadelmann, Full Faith and Credit to Judgments and Public Acts, 56 MICH. L. REv.
33 (1957); Sumner, The Full-Faith-and-Credit Clause-Its History and Purpose, 34 ORE. L. REV.
224 (1955).
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legal system, or from brushing aside the legitimate interests of
another state without solid justification.
Unless a forum state directly challenges the requirements of
federalism (for example, by refusing to adjudicate disputes arising
in any other state), one must clearly identify the other state or
states having an interest and determine the extent of the insult
they would suffer from having their law ignored. 61 The problem is
more difficult than with full faith and credit to judgments, where
the focus on, and sensitivity of, the rendering state is clear. Some-
thing must take the place of the judgment to provide the necessary
focus on the law of a particular state, unless the case involves a
significant question of nationwide harmony. Moreover, unless a
failure to defer to a given state's law would represent a clear slap in
the face to that state or to the federal system itself, the full faith
and credit clause and the Supreme Court simply cannot assume the
day-to-day task of sorting out the provincialism still at large.62
Professor Martin, however, argues that the full faith and credit
balancing test 63 should apply,when the connection between the
defendant and the forum is relatively weak. He would have courts
"weigh... [the] competing state interests, both in terms of quantity
and importance. '6 4 He concedes that this is an uncertain process,
but asserts that it accounts for the results of the cases. 65 The
61 Although the full faith and credit clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, refers only to
"public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings," without making clear whether this in-
cludes common law, authorities now agree that it does. See, e.g., Currie, The Constitution and
the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. Cii. L. REV. 9, 15-16
(1958), reprinted in B. CURRIE, supra note 9, at 196; Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The
Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 CoLum. L. REV. 1, 12 (1945). See also Magnolia Pe-
troleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 436 (1943) (reference to full faith and credit "to which
local common and statutory law is entitled").
62 Some would use the full faith and credit clause as an enabling measure for federaliz-
ing choice of law in diversity cases or even in all cases. Compare Baxter, Choice of Law and
the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 33-42 (1963), with Cardozo, Choosing and Declaring
State Law: Deference to State Courts Versus Federal Responsibility, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 419, 431-36
(1960); cf. Horowitz, Toward a Federal Common Law of Choice of Law, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REv.
1191 (1967). Before that happens one would hope to find a relatively high degree of
consensus supporting a single choice-of-law approach. If anything, the level of consensus
has receded since Professor Cheatham's 1953 lament that a federal choice-of-law system
was premature because of the relative infancy of conflicts doctrine. See Cheatham, supra
note 44, at 588. Professors Baxter and Cardozo disagree as to the choice-of-law methodol-
ogy they would extract from the full faith and credit clause.
63 See text accompanying note 2 supra.
64 Martin, supra note 1, at 216.
65 Id. He seems to consider the strength of the connection (in terms of a party's physi-
cal presence in the forum or derivation of benefits from it) as an independent standard
satisfying any full faith and credit objections. But full faith and credit concerns the in-
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danger in such an assertion is that one might simply assign weights,
without any determinable standard, to justify the results of cases
decided on other premises, or that weighing will become a constitu-
tional tool for selecting results one might desire on "better substan-
tive law" grounds. Except in a very limited sense, the cases do not
support a balancing standard.
B. The Leading Full Faith and Credit Cases
Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper:66 A power company line-
man who was employed and normally worked in Vermont was sent
to fix burned-out fuses just across the state line in New Hampshire.
While doing so, he came in contact with a high-power line and was
killed on the spot. He left no dependents.6 7 Although Vermont
had a workmen's compensation act that purported to provide an
exclusive remedy, his administratrix sued the employer in New
Hampshire under a New Hampshire statute permitting wrongful
death recovery for an employer's negligence. The United States
Supreme Court held that permitting such a suit would deny full
faith and credit to the Vermont act. The administratrix argued
that recognition of the Vermont act would be contrary to New
Hampshire public policy, and thus should not be required. The
Court responded by pointing out that the Vermont act did not
offend New Hampshire's policy. The Court did not think (as a
casual reading of some of the later cases might suggest)68 that New
Hampshire would consider Vermont's law compatible with its own,
but found that New Hampshire had no interest-or, as the Court
said, only a "casual" interest 69-in applying its policy to the specific
facts of the case.
Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial Accident Commission :70 A
workmen's compensation award by the state of employment was
terests of states, not simply the nexus between the forum and the parties or the transac-
tion. In some cases such connections might suggest an absence of other states' interests and
obviate the need for full faith and credit protection, but not in all cases. Cf. Broderick v.
Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935), discussed in text accompanying notes 80 & 125 infra. Profes-
sor Martin's "connection with the forum" test is essentially a due process notion.
66 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
67 For a full statement of the facts, see Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 51 F.2d
992, 993-94 (1st Cir. 1931).
68 See Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 504 (1939);
Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 549 (1935).
69 Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 162 (1932).
70 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
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upheld, although the recipient was a nonresident, and had been
injured outside the state of employment. The United States Su-
preme Court stressed the interest of the state of employment in
applying its compensation scheme and the prima facie right of
every state to enforce its own statutes. Some interest-balancing lan-
guage was used.
Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commis-
sion:7' The Supreme Court upheld a workmen's compensation
award by the state of the accident although the injured nonresident
had entered into the employment relationship in the state of his
residence (where the workmen's compensation scheme purported
to be the exclusive remedy). California, the state of the accident,
had declared its policy to protect not only the employee but par-
ticularly any local medical creditors. 72 Medical creditors had filed
liens against the plaintiff under the California act.7 3 The Court
distinguished Clapper on the ground that, "there was nothing in the
New Hampshire statute, the decisions of its courts, or in the circum-
stances of the case, to suggest that reliance on the provisions of the
Vermont statute . . . was obnoxious to the policy of New
Hampshire. '' 74 The Court in Pacific Employers declined to enter into
an interest-balancing process.
Carroll v. Lanza:75 As in Pacific Employers, a person domiciled
and employed in one state (Missouri) was injured in another (Ar-
kansas) in the course of employment. As in Clapper, the plaintiff
brought a tort action for damages in the state of injury, although
this time the defendant was not the immediate employer. The in-
jured employee had returned to his home state right after the
injury, apparently leaving no medical creditors in the state of in-
jury. It was held that awarding common-law damages would not
deny full faith and credit to the workmen's compensation law of
the state of employment. Pacific Employers, in the Supreme Court's
view, had "departed . .. from the Clapper decision. '7 6 Without
balancing state interests, the Court said that in the type of case
before it, "[t]he State where the tort occurs certainly has a concern
in the problems following in the wake of the injury. The problems
71 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
72 Id. at 504.
73 Id. at 498.
741 Id. at 504 (emphasis added).
75 349 U.S. 408 (1955).
76 Id. at 412.
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of medical care and of possible dependents are among these, as
[Pacific Employers] emphasizes. 77
Hughes v. Fetter:78 The Wisconsin wrongful death act, as con-
strued by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, precluded wrongful
death actions in Wisconsin when the death was caused outside the
state. The plaintiff brought suit in Wisconsin for a death caused in
Illinois. The Supreme Court held that Wisconsin denied the Il-
linois act full faith and credit by refusing to entertain the action.
No Wisconsin policy prevented wrongful death suits in general,
there was no forum non conveniens argument (since all parties
were from Wisconsin), and Wisconsin did not assert any interest in
applying its own law on the merits. It had simply discriminated
against wrongful death claims "arising" elsewhere. 79
Broderick v. Rosner:80 A New Jersey statute provided that no
suit to enforce a stockholder liability statute of another state could
be brought in its courts, unless certain virtually insuperable pro-
cedural obstacles were overcome. The New York Superintendent
of Banks sued the New Jersey stockholders of a New York bank
having all its places of business in New York City, to enforce as-
sessments made under a New York statute rendering stockholders
of an insolvent bank liable for its debts to the extent of the par
value of their stock. The Supreme Court obviously regarded the
insulation of New Jersey stockholders from such liability as the real
purpose of the New Jersey statute. The Court stressed that the
subject matter was peculiarly within the regulatory power of New
York,"' and that it was focusing on the New York statute (rather
than on the assessments) as the public act to which full faith and
credit was owed.82 It said:
Obviously, recognition could not be accorded to a local policy of
New Jersey, if there really were one, of enabling all residents of
the State to escape from the performance of a voluntarily as-
7 Id. at 413.
78 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
'9 The Court supplied this Hughes construction in Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345
U.S. 514 (1953) (upholding application of forum's statute of limitations to bar claim arising
in another state). See also Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 413 (1955). Hughes was followed
in First Nail Bank v. United Air Lines, Inc., 342 U.S. 396 (1952).
80 294 U.S. 629 (1935).
1 Id. at 643. Although the Court supported this assertion simply by pointing out that
New York was the state of incorporation, in fact the bank centered its business there. Thus
the case for enforcement of the New York statute was stronger than the Court suggested.
82 Id. The assessments might have been assimilated to judgments for full faith and
credit purposes, but were not.
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sumed statutory obligation, consistent with morality, to contrib-
ute to the payment of the depositors of a bank of another State
of which they were stockholders.8 3
This suggests that a forthright New Jersey policy against stock-
holder liability, all other facts being the same, would also have been
unavailing.
John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Yates: s4 The insurer
issued a life insurance policy in New York to a New Yorker who
had misrepresented his state of health on the policy application. A
month later, the insured died from a pre-existing disease. His
widow moved to Georgia and brought suit on the policy. New York
law made a material misrepresentation in the application a com-
plete defense on the policy even if the insurance agent knew about
the misrepresentation. Georgia law imputed an agent's knowledge
of the facts to the company, and left the materiality of any misrep-
resentation to the jury. The Georgia courts held that these matters
went to the remedy only; consequently, the law of the forum con-
trolled. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed a jury verdict for
the face amount of the policy. The United States Supreme Court
struck down Georgia's blatantly self-serving "procedural" charac-
terization, holding that Georgia had to extend full faith and credit
to the New York statute.85
Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp. :86 The Supreme
Court briefly considered full faith and credit after disposing of the
due process argument against the application of Lonisiana's
direct-action statute. The Court held that full faith and credit did
not require Louisiana to subordinate its law to that of Mas-
sachusetts, where the insurance contract was executed, and where
the company whose division manufactured the defective product
had its headquarters. The Supreme Court asserted: "[P]lainly these
[Massachusetts] interests cannot outweigh the interest of Louisiana
in taking care of those injured in Louisiana. ' 87 The Louisiana
83 Id. at 644.
84 299 U.S. 178 (1936).
85 The opinion contains some language reflecting now-obsolete vested rights choice-of-
law doctrine. It is apparent, however, that the Court was primarily motivated by the prin-
ciple that one state should not be allowed to twist a standard choice-of-law technique (in
the Yates case, characterization) to avoid having to select the law of the state that clearly
would have been selected by proper use of the technique. The principle would apply
equally today to techniques other than those supplied by the first RESTATEMENT Or CON-
FLICT OF LAWS (1934).
86 348 U.S. 66 (1954). See text accompanying note 14 supra.
87 348 U.S. at 73.
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statute did not discriminate against non-Louisiana insurance pol-
icies, nor was it a subterfuge for some other policy directed against
sister-state interests.
Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe:88 The constitution
of a fraternal benefit society incorporated and having its principal
office in Ohio provided death benefits as a major perquisite of
membership, but prohibited any action on a claim more than six
months after its disallowance by the society's governing body. The
provision was valid under Ohio law, which authorized such so-
cieties and closely regulated them. A South Dakota member died,
leaving his mother (also a South Dakota domiciliary) as his ben-
eficiary. When her claim was disallowed, she challenged the disal-
lowance in court within the six-month period. She lost on appeal,
but the proceedings were ultimately dismissed without prejudice.
She then assigned her claim to Wolfe, an Ohio domiciliary, who
was to act in a fiduciary capacity to enforce the claim for her. The
assignment took place more than six months after disallowance of
the decision by the society. When Wolfe brought suit in South
Dakota, the court applied a South Dakota statute invalidating the
society's six-month limitation period. The United States Supreme
Court, in a five-to-four decision, held that South Dakota, by refus-
ing to enforce a provision valid under Ohio law, had violated the
full faith and credit clause.
The Court stressed that more than a normal insurance con-
tract was involved. Rather, it was dealing with a voluntary fraternal
organization having members in many states with organizational
benefits and obligations determined by one unifying law. 89 In the
view of the majority, bits and pieces of the unifying law could not
be removed by a state other than the enabling state without seri-
ously upsetting the unified whole. Near the end of a long opinion,
the majority gave an indication that it had been weighing policies:
88 331 U.S. 586 (1947).
89 The Court noted that the society's constitution filled 90 closely-printed pamphlet
pages, setting up a complicated structure of councils and officers, and designating mem-
bership conditions, rules for meetings, benefits and assessments, and procedures for
amending the constitution. Id. at 602-05. The majority relied on a series of fraternal ben-
efit society cases in which the same point had been stressed: It was essential that all states
defer to the single unifying law of such a multipurpose, representative organization. See,
e.g., Modern Woodmen of America v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544 (1925) (absent member's pre-
sumed death must be determined by law of state of incorporation); Supreme Council of
the Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531 (1915) (by-law amendment valid everywhere
when upheld by court in state of incorporation).
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The weight of public policy behind the general statute of South
Dakota, which seeks to avoid certain provisions in ordinary con-
tracts, does not equal that which makes necessary the recognition
of the same terms of membership for members of fraternal
benefit societies wherever their beneficiaries may be.90
Finally, the Court added a sentence that has engendered some
misunderstanding:
It is of the essence of the full faith and credit clause that, if a
state gives some faith and credit to the public acts of another state
by permitting its own citizens to become members of, and benefit
from, fraternal benefit societies organized by such other state,
then -it must give full faith and credit to those public acts and
must recognize the burdens and limitations which are inherent in
such memberships.9 1
C. Interest Balancing
Interest balancing language appears in a few of these cases,
9 2
and in some it is possible to conclude that the interests of one state
clearly outweigh those of another. But to draw from them an
interest-weighing test in any but the most restricted sense is to
attribute too much weight to a standard that does not have signifi-
cant force as a predictor of future outcomes, nor potential value as
a reasonably objective decision-making tool.9 3 Thus, for example,
the interest-balancing approach taken in Alaska Packers was quick-
ly abandoned in Pacific Employers and remained at rest in Carroll.94
Hughes v. Fetter9 5 was a full faith and credit balancing case only
in the most lopsided sense. Professor Martin clouds the issue by
viewing the result in "policy-balancing" terms. He argues that Wis-
consin had no policy on out-of-state wrongful death suits, since it
refused to hear such suits in its courts, and thus had nothing to
90 Order of Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 624 (1947).
91 Id. at 625 (emphasis in original). It is tempting to assume that the outcome in Wolfe
was significantly influenced by the fact that the beneficiary had clearly had her day in
court.
92 See, e.g., Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 418-19 (1955) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting
opinion) (interest-balancing language); Aldens, Inc. v. Packel, 524 F.2d 38, 44-45 (3d Cir.
1975), cert. denied sub nom. Aldens, Inc. v. Kane, 96 S. Ct. 1684 (1976).
93 Cf. R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 39, at 203; Jackson, supra note 61, at 28.
'* There is dictum in Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 15 (1962), suggesting that
despite the Supreme Court's rather hazy concept of state interests, it would not espouse
any broadly applicable balancing test. See also Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d
553, 558 n.12 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963).
95 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
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weigh against the Illinois policy supporting wrongful death recov-
ery for deaths in Illinois. 96 But it is not apparent why Wisconsin's
attempt to avoid entertaining suits of that sort indicates disavowal
of a policy on the matter. There may have been a policy to relieve
court congestion by eliminating cases in which Wisconsin was un-
likely to have a substantive interest,97 or to eliminate suits under
unfamiliar wrongful death acts when foreign plaintiffs would nor-
mally be pitted against Wisconsin defendants. 98 Neither of these
possible policies could withstand full faith and credit challenge
under the facts of Hughes, but it is not because they were dis-
avowed. It is because Wisconsin had no interest in applying them
to the Hughes case, and by doing so anyway it discriminated without
cause against Illinois.
If the policy was to eliminate cases in which Wisconsin was
unlikely to have an interest, that policy was obviously inapplicable
since the parties were all Wisconsinites. If the policy was to elimi-
nate suits under unfamiliar wrongful death acts that might favor
nonresident plaintiffs, it too would be inapplicable and would in
any event simply underline Wisconsin's discrimination against
foreign causes of action as well as against foreign plaintiffs. Conse-
quently, Wisconsin had no interest in applying either policy; its
only reason for applying the statute was to close its doors to a cause
of action solely because it arose in another state. 99 In a sense, a
balance of interests, not policies, was involved. But it is tenuous at
best to draw a broadly applicable balancing test from a case in
which the forum had no interest to put in the scale.
96 Martin, supra note 1, at 218-20. Throughout most of Professor Martin's Article, he
focuses on "interest-balancing" rather than "policy-balancing." The difference would be
comparable to the difference between Professor Baxter's comparative impairment and Pro-
fessor Leflar's "better law" approaches to choice of law. Compare Baxter, supra note 62, with
Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. Rv. 1584,
1587-88 (1966).
:7 See 35 MARQ. L. REV. 303, 305 (1952). Supporting citation is not given in this stu-
dent piece.
98 See Currie, The Constitution and the "Transitory" Cause of Action, 73 HARv. L. REv. 36,
55-59 (1959), reprinted in B. CORRIE, supra note 9, at 301-04. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
said it was following a statutory policy, but it conveniently neglected to say what that policy
was. Hughes v. Fetter, 257 Wis. 35, 38, 42 N.W.2d 452, 453 (1950), rev'd, 341 U.S. 609
(1951).
99 If the Wisconsin policy really sought to eliminate court congestion, then the statute,
as interpreted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, was too broad. Had it been drafted nar-
rowly, to preclude only suits in which the doctrine of forum non conveniens would legiti-
mately apply, it would not have barred the action in Hughes and probably would have
avoided any full faith and credit problems. Cf. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 612-13
(1951).
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Professor Martin also finds a balancing explanation for the
result in Watson: "The interests of Louisiana in the compensation
of its domiciliary outweigh the 'procedural' interest of Mas-
sachusetts or Illinois to uphold the contract clause barring direct
actions."' 100 This is not much more helpful than the balancing ex-
planation of Hughes. Watson, however, was a true conflict in inter-
est-analysis terms.' Weighing the interests in a true conflict-
at least as a matter of constitutional compulsion-is a slippery
process that the Supreme Court wisely avoided. When it said that
Massachusetts's interest "cannot outweigh the interest of Louisi-
ana," 0 2 it was simply eschewing any attempt to assign weights to
each interest. It was enough that Louisiana had a significant inter-
est in taking care of those injured there. For this the Court relied
on Pacific Employers, another case in which it had declined to enter
into a balancing process.
I am talking here only about a constitutional outer limit on the
latitude of a state to apply its own law. If a state wishes to adopt
some form of interest-balancing as its normal choice-of-law
method, or perhaps as a tie-breaker for true conflicts in the
interest-analysis sense, it should be free to do so within broad
boundaries. It remains, then, to be determined just what those full
faith and credit boundaries are.
D. Full Faith and Credit Formulation
Taking into account what the Supreme Court has actually said
and done, it is possible to formulate full faith and credit standards
that are sufficiently well defined to have predictive power for fu-
ture cases. Because some latitude for provincialism must necessar-
ily be granted, the following standards are stated primarily as limit-
ing factors, allowing whatever they do not expressly preclude:
(A) The forum state cannot devise a policy or rule for a par-
ticular case or discrete class of cases that defeats a claim for relief
or a defense created by the law (at least if it is statutory law, but
100 Martin, supra note I, at 211.
101 The insurance company was British but was doing business in Massachusetts,
under whose law it would be protected from the direct action. Gillette, which procured the
insurance for its Toni division, was headquartered in Massachusetts. The Massachusetts
policy apparently was designed to protect insurance companies from inflated jury verdicts
in order to hold premiums down. Massachusetts would be interested in applying its law to
effectuate that policy protecting not only the insurance company doing business there, but
Massachusetts-headquartered companies, such as Gillette, whose premiums would reflect
inflated verdicts against their insurers.
12 See text accompanying note 87 supra.
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probably also common law) of another state whose law the forum
would apply under its normal choice-of-law approach. Thus:
(1) It cannot refuse to provide a forum for adjudication of
a transitory dispute arising out of an occurrence or relationship
in another state, solely because it arose in another state or
solely as a subterfuge for some disguised policy applicable to
the merits of the dispute. It may, however, refuse to provide a
forum if its refusal would effectuate a genuine policy for the
orderly administration of justice or a genuine moral standard it
considers fundamental-provided that its policy or standard is
not so aberrational as to be thoroughly out of line with prevail-
ing norms among virtually all other states.
(2) The forum state cannot defeat an otherwise enforce-
able claim or applicable defense based on another state's law by
blatantly manipulating its professed choice-of-law method to
apply its own law.
(B) The forum cannot choose its own law on a particular issue
when, on the specific facts:
(1) Another state has an interest in applying its law that is
overwhelming by comparison with the interest of the forum; or
(2) there is an overwhelming reason to decide all similar
claims according to one legal system, and one state other than
the forum clearly would be the bellwether.
(C) The forum cannot apply a statute of another state in a way
that seriously distorts a nondivisible statutory scheme formulated
by that state's legislature, unless the forum can justify its action by
simply applying its own law to reach the same result.
E. Explanation
Category (A) reflects the Hughes-Broderick-Yates series of cases.
As noted above, Hughes states the principle that a state cannot close
its courthouse doors to transitory claims solely because they arise
elsewhere; it may also represent the principle against subterfuge in
(A)(1). 10 3 Broderick clearly represents the principle against subter-
103 It is an open question whether refusal to provide a forum for sister-state penal or
tax claims would run afoul of (A)(1). Probably the refusal to hear a sister-state tax claim
should be held impermissible under that principle, if the tax liability runs against the per-
son or moveable property. Rarely, if ever, would the orderly administration of justice in
the forum be seriously disturbed by hearing such claims. But see Leflar, Out-of-State Collec-
tion of State and Local Taxes, 29 VAND. L. REV. 443, 447-48 (1976) (questioning whether
Supreme Court would require enforcement of sister-state tax claims). Truly penal
matters-enforcement of the criminal law-might fall within the "orderly administration of
justice" exception because of the strong belief that the mores of the place of conduct weigh
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fuge. As the Court implied, and as Professor Brainerd Currie
clearly showed, the New Jersey legislature really wanted to change
the entrenched state-of-incorporation choice-of-law rule to protect
New Jersey residents who were stockholders of foreign corpora-
tions. It apparently feared full faith and credit repercussions if it
acted directly, so it devised a forum-restricting scheme that made it
virtually impossible to use the New Jersey courts to enforce any
stockholder liability created by the law of another state. 10 4
The Supreme Court has indicated that a state may refuse to
provide a forum out of a genuine concern for the orderly ad-
ministration of justice or when it has a genuine public policy
against recognition of the claim asserted, subject to Supreme Court
review for basic consistency with the principles of federalism. 10 5
Thus, if it is truly an inconvenient forum, a state court may apply
the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The public policy exception
is more difficult, because it is more subjective. The Court has given
unmistakable signals that a state may not simply announce that it
has a public policy against entertaining the claim at hand and thus
avoid further full faith and credit scrutiny. 10 6 Consequently, the
authority of a state to deny a forum on public policy grounds
probably would (and clearly should) be limited to situations in
which fundamental, nonaberrational moral precepts incorporated
in that state's law would be significantly impaired if it were to
entertain the action.'0 7 If it has a policy that does not rise to the
level of a fundamental moral precept, it could still apply its own
heavily in the outcome, and because of the relative ease of transfer (through extradition) to
the state best equipped to decide the case. On the distinctions between penal and tax
claims, see State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Rodgers, 238 Mo. App. 1115, 193
S.W.2d 919 (1946); Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims, 46 HARV.
L. REv. 193 (1932). See also Leathers, Dimensions of the Constitutional Obligation To Provide A
Forum, 62 Ky. L.J. 1, 22-32 (1973).
104 See Currie, supra note 98, at 287-88, reprinted in B. CURRIE, supra note 9, at 345-46.
Cf. Ohio ex rel. Squire v. Porter, 21 Cal. 2d 45, 56-57, 129 P.2d 691, 698 (1942) (Traynor,
J., dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 757 (1943).
105 See Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 612-13 (1951); Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S.
498, 507 (1941); Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 160 (1932). Cf. Currie,
supra note 98, at 299-303, reprinted in B. CURRIE, supra note 9, at 357-60.
106 See Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 643-45 (1935); Converse v. Hamilton, 224
U.S. 243, 260 (1912).
107 If the public policy forum-closing device is narrowly defined, as suggested, there
seems neither reason nor authority to do away with it altogether, as urged by Leathers,
supra note 103, at 8-21, and Seidelson, Full Faith and Credit: A Modest Proposal ... or Two,
31 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 462, 463-76 (1962). For example, there is no reason why a state
with a strong moral policy against gambling should be required to open its courts to claims
based on Las Vegas gambling debts.
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law on the merits-provided that it transgresses no other constitu-
tional restrictions, including the full faith and credit limitations
regarding choice of law on the merits.' 0 8
Yates involved a blatant choice-of-law manipulation of the sort
proscribed by category (A)(2).' 0 9 The same principle would apply if
a court professing to use interest analysis blatantly misconstrued
the policy underlying another state's law, in order to justify appli-
cation of forum law. These serious distortions of the choice-of-law
process are rare, but when they do occur they involve such an
unprincipled departure from normalcy in interstate choice of law
that full faith and credit must step in to restore order-even if
application of forum law might be justifiable under some choice-of-
law method other than that professed by the forum." 0
Category (B)(1) concerns the overwhelmingly interested state
under the modern interest analysis approach. A state is interested
when the policy (or at least one of the policies) reflected in its
specific rule of law would be furthered by applying that rule to the
facts before the court. If it is the only state with such an interest,
there is a false conflict and its law should be applied. To fail to do
so would be a gratuitous insult if the interested state is not the
forum state."' Implicit in category (B)(1) is the proposition that
full faith and credit principles require that only the law of the in-
terested state be applied if it is the nonforum state. Clapper was and
still is authority for this proposition, despite the disparaging re-
marks about Clapper in the Carroll opinion.
The majority in Carroll said that Pacific Employers had "de-
'os See text describing categories (B) and (C) supra.
109 See text accompanying note 84 supra. See also Cheatham, supra note 44, at 593;
Leflar, supra note 44, at 719-20. One can infer from James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co.
v. Harry, 273 U.S. 119, 126 (1927), that a distorted characterization of a sister-state exem-
plary damage statute as penal would be proscribed on this basis. Cf. Leathers, supra note
103, at 25-26.
110 The "choice-of-law revolution" presents some problems in this connection. The new
learning is not always clearly understood. As a result, courts attempting to apply interest
analysis sometimes apply the rules of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) instead, or simply fail to
realize that analysis of substantive law and policy, and not just of the state's "interest" in
the transaction or in the parties, is an essential step in interest analysis. See, e.g., Commer-
cial Union Ins. Co. v. Upjohn Co., 409 F. Supp. 453 (W.D. La. 1976); Simkins Indus., Inc.
v. Fuld & Co., 392 F. Supp. 126 (E.D. Pa. 1975). Such cases would not violate the "blatant
manipulation" full faith and credit principle if, given the benefit of the doubt, they simply
involve a good faith, but misguided, attempt to apply the new learning. The defiance of
federalism would be missing.
11 If the forum fails to apply its own law when it is the only interested state, there is
no gratuitous insult to a sister state and therefore no full faith and credit violation.
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parted" from Clapper.1 2 The Pacific Employers Court noted that
Clapper decided only that a workmen's compensation act of the
employment state will be given full faith and credit in the injury
state, "when not obnoxious to its policy. 1" 3 But Clapper talked
about the policy of the state of injury in two quite distinct senses,
without making the distinction clear-at least not to the majority in
Carroll. At one point the Clapper Court used the term traditionally,
referring to the public policy escape device recognized by the
vested rights, 1 4 first Restatement of the Conflicts of Laws approach.' 15
It indicated that this escape device could not be used to defeat a
substantive defense created by the applicable law of another
state. 1 6 It then used "policy" in a different, more modern sense. It
said, in effect, that on the specific facts before it-the electrocution
and death on the spot of a workman from another state who had
crossed the state line for the most temporary of purposes and who
left no dependents-New Hampshire's policy of providing com-
pensation through a wrongful death remedy would not be fur-
thered by applying that remedy." 7 It was, in other words, a nonin-
terested, or "casually" interested, state.
The Pacific Employers decision apparently referred only to this
second "policy" aspect of Clapper. Although the language in Pacific
Employers does not make this explicit, the Court cited only the por-
tion of the Clapper opinion using "policy" in this interest-analysis
sense." 8 Moreover, in interest-analysis terms, Pacific Employers is
easily distinguishable since the employee was in California (the
state of injury) for a longer time, thus arguably increasing
California's "interest" in applying its own law, and was given medi-
cal care by Californians who had statutory liens against the
California workmen's compensation proceeds. Thus it is difficult to
see how Pacific Employers "departed" from Clapper. 19
112 Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 412 (1955). See text accompanying note 76 supra.
113 Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 504 (1939). See
text accompanying note 74 supra.
'14 See 3 J. BEALE, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1647-51 (1935).
115 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 612 (1934).
116 Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 160 (1932).
117Id. at 161-62.
118 The citation was to Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. at 161.
"
9 Paciflc Employers is not the only case in which the Court has correctly distinguished
Clapper without clearly pointing out by difference between forum nominterest in Clapper
and the forum interest in the case before it. In Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941),
the Court repeated its Pacific Employers characterization of Clapper while holding that Texas
could apply its own law requiring that life insurance beneficiaries have an insurable in-
terest in the life of the insured. The Texas policy was to protect the insured "against the
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There were neither medical creditors nor dependents in Ar-
kansas (the state of injury) in Carroll. But Carroll, the injured em-
ployee, had a far more sustained relationship with Arkansas than
Clapper had with New Hampshire. He was the foreman for a
subcontractor doing all the painting required by defendant Lanza's
prime contract to construct the Bull Shoals Dam in Arkansas, a few
miles from the Missouri border. The subcontract was made a little
more than a year before Carroll's injury. 120 The lower court opin-
ion reveals that Carroll himself was involved with the phase of the
project that resulted in his injury for two months before the acci-
dent occurred.' 2 ' Since he was a foreman, one assumes that he was
at the Arkansas job site regularly from shortly after the subcontract
was entered into until his injury. Whether he lived at the job site or
commuted the few miles each day from Missouri is not made clear
in the opinion.' 22 In either case, it is certainly plausible to conclude
that his work relationship with Arkansas had reached the point at
which Arkansas would have an interest in effectuating the compen-
satory policy underlying its rule permitting supplementation of
workmen's compensation benefits by an action against a general
contractor.
If the Supreme Court majority had focused on these facts,
Clapper could have been distinguished and there would have been
no need to rely on the erroneous assumption that Pacific Employers
had weakened the Clapper holding. If one considers the result in
Carroll rather than the Court's dicta, the Clapper principle remains
intact. Even if we take account only of what the Court said, only a
minor caveat is cast over the Clapper principle. The majority in
Carroll recognized that in the usual case, the state of injury will
have an interest in applying its compensatory law to protect its
medical creditors or dependents, though the Court failed to recog-
nize that there was also an independent interest in protecting the
employee in the case before it. The majority stressed that the opin-
ion was being written for the type of case in which the state of
assumed dangers of insurance on their lives held by strangers." Id. at 507. Since the in-
sured in Griffin was a Texan, Texas had a clear interest in the effectuation of its policy.
120 See Carroll v. Lanza, 116 F. Supp. 491, 494, 498 (W.D. Ark. 1953).
121 The fullest statement of facts appears in the district court's opinion; see id. at
494-99.
122 It does appear that the injured employee eventually was taken to a hospital in
Springfield, Missouri-a distance of more than 50 miles from the job site. Id. at 498-99. If
he was taken there to be close to home, he lived too far from the job to have commuted
conveniently. On the other hand, his injury was serious and Springfield may have been the
closest city with adequate hospital facilities.
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injury does have a potential, if not actual interest.12 3 The Clapper
principle survives whenever the forum does not have an interest in
applying its own law to the specific facts and a court elects to
decide only the precise case presented. 124
Carroll and Pacific Employers might suggest that in the case of a
true conflict, the "overwhelmingly interested state" principle would
never apply. But Broderick seems to have been a true conflict in
which the Supreme Court would have required deference to the
nonforum state's law if that question had been squarely presented.
In Broderick, the New Jersey forum-closing law was apparently
designed to protect New Jersey stockholders from liability beyond
the purchase price of their shares. 25 New Jersey had an interest in
applying its policy in an action involving New Jersey stockholder-
defendants, even though the potential liabilities of individual
stockholders were relatively slight.' 26 But New York also had an
interest in applying its law: The insolvent bank was not only incor-
porated in New York, but all its business offices were located there.
It is very likely that the great majority of its 400,000 depositors and
creditors were New Yorkers, and New York law protected the de-
positors and creditors by authorizing stockholder assessments.
Moreover, it is highly probable that the great bulk of the bank's
stockholders were New Yorkers. 127 New York not only had an
interest in applying its law, it had the overriding interest in provid-
ing an orderly scheme for the delicate business of winding up the
affairs of the New York-incorporated, New York-centered, insol-
vent bank. The Supreme Court clearly indicated that under the
circumstances New Jersey would have been required by full faith
and credit to apply New York law on the merits.' 28
123 See Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 413 (1955).
124 For a different argument suggesting Clapper's continuing viability, see R.
WEINTRAUB, supra note 39, at 409-10. See also Currie, supra note 61, at 27, reprinted in B.
CURRIE, supra note 9, at 210, arguing that Clapper presented a false. conflict because the
New Hampshire wrongful death statute provided no fund for local medical creditors, had
there been any, and that there were no dependents. This would distinguish Carroll, since
the type of remedy involved there (for injury, not for wrongful death) would provide a
fund for local medical creditors if any existed.
125 See Currie, supra note 61, at 287-90, reprinted in B. CURRIE, supra note 9, at 345-47.
126 The potential liability of some defendants was only $50. Broderick v. Rosner, 294
U.S. 629, 640 (1935).
127 Only 557 out of 20,843 lived in New Jersey. Id. at 638, 640.
12 Id. at 647. See text accompanying note 83 supra. Specifically, the Court indicated
that New Jersey could not use the public policy escape device to avoid application of New
York statutory liability. Since any such use of the escape device would have been tanta-
mount to choice of New Jersey law on the merits, that too would have been precluded.
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To summarize, the requirements of federalism demand that
the forum not be so provincial as to apply its own law in the face of
an overwhelming interest of another state. The clearest case is the
false conflict, when the forum is the noninterested state.' 29 A simi-
lar example is the truly disinterested forum, which should not be
allowed to apply its own law rather than that of an interested state,
unless its law is just being used as a surrogate for the substantially
identical law of an interested state.13 0 But the principle would ex-
tend also to a small number of true conflicts, when it can confi-
dently and objectively be said that the nonforum state not only has
an interest in applying its own rule, but has a concern with the
matter that unquestionably transcends the concern of the forum.' 31
Such a concern would not normally arise solely on the basis of
traditional contacts, and would not be ascertained by a weighing
test in any but the most lopsided sense.' 32
Category (B)(2)133 reflects the Wolfe decision and the other
129 A noninterested forum is one with an arguable basis for applying its own law under
some recognized choice-of-law approach, but which has no interest in effectuating the
policies reflected in its rule on the specific facts of the case. Such a forum is to be distin-
guished from a disinterested forum, which is one that is truly neutral as to the outcome
and would have no basis for applying its own law, except possibly as a last resort if no
other choice makes sense.
In the "unprovided-for case," in which no state is interested, the forum could apply its
own law in the absence of some constitutional prohibition unrelated to overwhelming state
interest.
1-0 See Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 754, 780 (1963).
The forum's interest in a case must be analyzed with respect to the specific choice-of-law
issue. Thus if the choice-of-law issue relates directly to judicial administration (e.g., choice
of the applicable statute of limitations, if the forum period is the shorter of the two), the
forum would be interested even though it might be a disinterested (or noninterested)
forum on the merits.
'3 But see Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 15 (1962) (dictum) (troublesome on
this point, as is its choice-of-law outcome). The dictum makes it appear that a forum could
apply its own law even if another state were clearly more interested. On the facts, however,
the forum applied the law of a third state. When the forum applies another state's law, it is
difficult to imagine that the full faith and credit antiprovincialism policy would ever inter-
fere. See note 111 supra. Moreover, it is clear from the manner and context in which the
Court used the "state interest" terminology that it did not clearly focus on interest analysis.
See note 39 supra. The result, however, can be supported under the constitutional tests
proposed in this Article. See note 179 infra.
132 In addition, the principle probably should not be applied when the issue is only
incidental to the main dispute, since the insult to the sister state ordinarily would be slight.
In Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), the Supreme Court held that full
faith and credit did not require choice of the otherwise applicable law to determine
whether interest was payable on an award of contract damages, because interest was simply
"an incidental item of damages .... Id. at 498.
'33 See Part II D supra.
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fraternal benefit society cases. The Court felt that because of the
complex quasi-governmental structure of those societies, all sig-
nificant questions arising under their constitutions had to be de-
cided under one bellwether law-the law of incorporation. 13 4 This
principle is clear and easily comprehended. The troublesome ques-
tion is whether it might apply to cases not involving fraternal
benefit societies. One possible explanation of Broderick suggests
that it does. That case could be viewed as deciding that the need
to look to one state's law to resolve the problems of insolvency is
so great that full faith and credit requires obeisance to the state of
incorporation, when that is also the principal place of business. 35
Category (C)' 36 is also suggested by Wolfe, although the non-
divisible "legislative" scheme in that case was actually the benefit
society's constitutional scheme enacted under authority granted by
the state of incorporation. 13 7 When the Supreme Court said that if
a state gives some faith and credit to the public acts of another state
it must givefull faith and credit to them,138 it was referring to the
case in which application of forum law to a portion of the "legisla-
tive" scheme would distort a closely interdependent whole in a
manner not achievable under forum or nonforum law alone.
D~pegage, of course, can be practiced when it does not disrupt
a unified legislative scheme. For example, a court applying New
York choice-of-law rules could permit an action nominally under
the former Massachusetts wrongful death act without its damage
limitation, when to do so would produce a result constitutionally
attainable under New York law alone.' 39 Statutory venue provi-
sions normally would not be severable from their correlative stat-
134 Professor Weintraub suggests that the fraternal benefit cases may have misjudged
the need for national uniformity. R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 39, at 410-11. He notes, how-
ever, that the full faith and credit clause does impose a national uniformity limitation not
found in the due process clause. Id. at 410. Professor Horowitz would apply the commerce
clause when national uniformity is important. Horowitz, supra note 3, at 814-21.
135 Cf. Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 635 (1947)
(Black, J., dissenting opinion); note 89 supra. There is some indication that the framers
were concerned with insolvency acts when they included "public Acts" in the full faith and
credit clause. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 447 (M. Far-
rand ed. 1911).
"I See Part II D supra.
3
'See Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 584, 637 (1947)
(Black, J., dissenting opinion); note 89 supra.
'
38 See text accompanying note 91 supra.
13' See Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 912 (1963).
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utory rights. 140 The same would be true of an exclusive administra-
tive remedy in a workmen's compensation act, although the case
establishing this principle is hardly a model of judicial analysis. 14 1
An example of a case that would fall within the "interdependent
statutory scheme" aspect of Wolfe appears in Part III below.
None of the leading cases upholding application of forum law
against full faith and credit attack-Alaska Packers, Pacific Employers,
Carroll, and Watson-would be affected by any of the limiting
categories outlined above.
III
SOME EXAMPLES
(1) Professor Martin poses a hypothetical based on Watson:
Insurance companies expressly exclude Louisiana from coverage in
their insurance contracts for the nationwide sale of goods. Louisi-
ana then enacts a statute negating that contractual exclusion for
insurance companies doing business in Louisiana, and notifies the
companies of its new statute. Another Watson case arises, in which
Louisiana applies both its new statute and its direct-action statute
against the company. Professor Martin concludes that Louisiana
could not constitutionally do so, because full faith and credit would
require deference to the interests of the states where the insurance
contracts were made and where the product manufacturers have
their business headquarters. 42 I agree that Louisiana could not
constitutionally proceed in this manner, but the barrier is due pro-
cess, not full faith and credit. Despite the occurrence of the injury
in the forum (a circumstance that should satisfy the power
rationale), the fairness requirement is not met. The contractual
relationship which Louisiana hypothetically tried to alter express-
ly excluded coverage there. Because Louisiana coverage was ex-
140 Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. George, 233 U.S. 354 (1914).
141 See Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39 (1965). Mr. Justice Douglas, who also
wrote the careless opinion in Carroll, relied on a sloppy reading of Alaska Packers and
Pacific Employers in holding that an Alabama court could apply the Georgia workmen's
compensation scheme although Georgia had created a compensation board specifically to
administer the scheme. Id. at 40-43. The Supreme Court need not have decided the con-
stitutional issue, since Alabama law precluded Alabama courts from splitting the Georgia
claim from the exclusive Georgia remedy. See Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 348 F.2d 211,
214-15 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1000 (1966).
142 Martin, supra note 1, at 210-11, 228.
[Vol. 62:94
LIMITATIONS ON CHOICE OF LAW
cluded, the insurer derived no benefit in the form of premiums
attributable to Louisiana and suffered some competitive disad-
vantage. It would be manifestly unfair to apply the Louisiana law
because no exchange of benefit for burden existed.143
Under the hypothesized facts, the only possible full faith and
credit argument would be that the interests of the other states were
overwhelming. But in this true conflict between Louisiana's interest
in protecting its injured resident and the other states' interests in
protecting the businesses centered there (and possibly in seeing
that the integrity of contracts made there is maintained), it is highly
implausible to say that the interests of any state or states are so
unquestionably predominant that they must prevail.
(2) Professor Martin also focuses on the New York no-fault
insurance law. It provides that every insurer authorized to do busi-
ness in New York must include in all its automobile policies, issued
in the United States or Canada, a clause providing no-fault cover-
age up to $50,000 for accidents in New York, and every such policy
is to be construed as if it contained that coverage. 144 Because the
New York no-fault law is drawn to cover all automobile accidents in
New York regardless of the residence or domicile of the parties,
this provision would apply even to a policy issued in a fault-liability
state to a resident of that state, if the insurer also does business in
New York.145 Professor Martin believes that this statute, like the
hypothetical Louisiana statute discussed above, violates full faith
and credit, since the insurance policies have minimal New York
contacts and the balance of state interests tips against New York. 46
This analysis again falls into the trap of elevating a vague
interest-weighing test to constitutional heights when reasonable
people might well differ as to the weights to be attached to the
interests involved. New York clearly does have an interest in apply-
ing its no-fault law to New York accidents involving nonresident
motorists. Among the policies underlying New York's law are the
decongestion of its courts through drastic reduction of automobile
accident litigation, and the speedy provision of funds needed for
143 A court deciding such a case would then have to consider the question avoided by
the majority in Watson-whether Louisiana could impose its new law as a condition to
doing business in Louisiana. See Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66,
73-74 (1954).
144 N.Y. INS. LAw § 676 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
145 For criticism of the territoriality aspect of the New York statute, see Kozyris, No-
Fault Automobile Insurance and the Conflict of Laws-Cutting the Gordian Knot Home-Style, 1972
DUKE L.J. 331, 367-73.
146 Martin, supra note 1, at 228-29.
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medical care.147 New York has a clear interest in applying those
governmental policies to all accidents in New York, since any re-
sulting litigation would be likely to occur there and any medical
creditors would probably be New Yorkers. Moreover, New York
has an essentially nondiscriminatory policy of treating all persons
injured in automobile accidents in the state alike.' 48 That policy
applies regardless of the person's residence and regardless of
where the insurance was issued. Who is to say, as a matter of con-
stitutional dogma, that these New York interests pale beside those
of the state of the motorist's residence and of the insurance
contract's issuance?
The New York scheme would seem also to withstand due pro-
cess attack. As in the case of the Louisiana hypothetical, the oc-
currence of the accident in New York would satisfy the power
rationale. But unless the out-of-state insurance contract expressly
excludes New York coverage, the insurer is receiving a benefit
attributable to New York by being able to charge for coverage
broad enough to protect the insured in all his peregrinations in
New York and elsewhere. The only exception might be the case of
an accident in New York before the insurer had a chance to adjust
its premium to take account of the New York law, but the time lag
between enactment and effective date of the law would have solved
this problem. 49 As in Watson, there would be no need to rely on
the right of New York to attach conditions to doing business in the
state.
(3) Contrast the position of the Canadian insurance com-
panies in the Cuban insurance cases. Typically, the companies is-
sued life insurance policies through their Havana offices to Cuban
residents before the Castro revolution. Most of the policies were
payable in United States dollars though some were payable from
the beginning in Cuban pesos. In any event, the dollar policies
were converted into peso policies by a 1951 Cuban decree. 50 In
some instances the policies provided that the proceeds were pay-
able in Havana, and in some instances in a designated place in the
14' See N.Y. INS. DEP'T, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE ... FOR WHOSE BENEFIT? 22, 75-76,
123 (1970). Before no-fault, about half the civil actions filed in the New York courts
stemmed from automobile accidents. Id. at 75.
148 Id. at 98-99.
149 The law was enacted in February 1973, with § 676 effective on February 1, 1974.
N.Y. INS. LAW § 670 note (McKinney Supp. 1976). See Comment, New York Adopts No-Fault:
A Summary and Analysis, 37 ALBANY L. REV. 662, 670 (1973).
"
50 See J. GOLD, THE CUBAN INSURANCE CASES AND THE ARTICLES OF THE FUND 3-4, 36
(1966).
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United States. After the 1951 decree, premiums were generally
paid in pesos and the companies kept their reserves attributable to
the policies in pesos in Havana. Following the Castro takeover,
many of the insureds and their beneficiaries fled to the United
States and sued the companies for the cash surrender values of the
policies in dollars. The insurers defended on the ground that
Cuban law applied. Under that law insurers were obligated only to
pay the face amounts in pesos, and since Cuban exchange control
regulations prevented them from remitting their peso reserves to
persons outside Cuba, they were either excused from performance
or were obligated only to pay the pesos in Havana. 151
Although some of the earlier cases turned on whether the
original obligation was to pay the insurance proceeds in the United
States or in Cuba (applying Cuban law only in the latter
instance), 152 more recently it has been held that Cuban law would
not be applied, and payment of the full cash surrender value in
dollars would be required, even on a policy payable in Havana, if it
originally specified payment in dollars. 53 This result has obtained
even when the insured never left Cuba for the United States. 154
Application of the law of the American forum in the latter case
would seem to violate due process. Although the power rationale
might be satisfied if the insurer had been doing business in the
forum all along, 55 the fairness standard is difficult to meet. The
insurance companies kept reserves in pesos in Havana to meet
their liabilities on the policies payable there, and the premiums and
proceeds were payable in pesos under a law enacted by Cuba to
15 See id. at 1-20.
152 Compare Theye y Ajuria v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 245 La. 755, 161 So. 2d 70,
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 997 (1964), with Confederation Life Ass'n v. Ugalde, 164 So. 2d 1
(Fla.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 915 (1964); cf. Confederation Life Ass'n v. Vega y Arminan,
207 So. 2d 33 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 980 (1968) (Cuban law avoided by finding
acceptance of "offer" to pay cash surrender value after insured had fled from Cuba to
Florida). See also Pan American Life Ins. Co. v. Blanco, 362 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1966).
M de Lara v. Confederation Life Ass'n, 257 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
953 (1972). Contra, Johansen v. Confederation Life Ass'n, 447 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1971); cf.
Santovenia v. Confederation Life Ass'n, 460 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1972) (applying Cuban law
on ground that policy was payable in pesos, and premiums were paid in pesos, from time
of issuance).
154 de Lara v. Confederation Life Ass'n, 257 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
953 (1972). The beneficiaries had settled in Florida.
The cases have rejected the argument that the act-of-state doctrine requires choice of
Cuban law. See, e.g., Johansen v. Confederation Life Ass'n, 447 F.2d 175, 180 (2d Cir.
1971); Pan American Life Ins. Co. v. Blanco, 362 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1966).
155 Even this is questionable if the policy was not issued from an office in the United
States and premiums were not paid here.
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govern these essentially local Cuban insurance policies. When the
policies were issued, it was not foreseeable that the Cuban
policyholders or their Cuban beneficiaries would ever move to the
United States. Thus the insurers could not reasonably foresee ever
receiving benefits related to the transaction from the United States;
if the insured never did come to the United States, the insurers
never derived actual benefits from any United States source.156
Such cases are analogous to Dick.157
(4) In Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Co., 158 an American court
sitting in admiralty applied its laches rule to permit a Panamanian
seaman to sue for benefits under the Panamanian Labor Code.
These benefits were payable when the seaman's ship was trans-
ferred by its British owner from Panamanian to Honduran registry;
the suit would have been barred by the one-year statute of limita-
tions in the Panamanian Code. No American parties were involved,
but the ship had made frequent calls at United States ports.159 For
purposes of satisfying the due process power rationale, the ques-
tion is whether these calls were sufficiently connected with the
claim so that the forum had something to grasp in applying its own
laches rule. 6  In light of the strong tendency in the United States
to treat claims as transitory, there probably would be sufficient
connection between the frequent calls and the claim of a right to
156 Justices Brennan and Douglas dissented from the Supreme Court's denial of cer-
tiorari in de Lara, arguing (though not explicitly by reference to a benefits test) that a force-
ful due process case had been made. Confederation Life Ins. Co. v. de Lara, 409 U.S. 953,
954-56 (1972).
The old refrain that one state will not enforce the revenue laws of another, even if still
viable, should not be used in these cases to avoid the due process issue. It is clear in a case
like de Lara that the forum is choosing its own law on the merits of a private dispute, and
not simply declining to lend its assistance to the efforts of another sovereign to collect
revenue for its Treasury. Compare Banco do Brasil, S.A. v. A. C. Israel Commodity Co., 12
N.Y.2d 371, 377, 190 N.E.2d 235, 237, 239 N.Y.S.2d 872, 875 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
906 (1964), with Banco Frances e Brasileiro, S.A. v. Doe, 36 N.Y.2d 592, 596-99, 331
N.E.2d 502, 505-07, 370 N.Y.S.2d 534, 537-40 (1975).
157 Cf. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1018 (1975); Recaman v. Barish, 408 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under securities laws as to sales of nonregistered securities outside United
States to foreigners; no contacts with U.S. and no benefits derived from U.S.).
158 220 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1955).
'59 Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Co., 117 F. Supp. 864, 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), rev'd,
220 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1955).
160 The due process power test should be applied to the specific issue at hand. See text
accompanying note 36 supra. Thus, the question here is whether the contacts are connected
with the right to be heard in the forum (the laches-statute of limitations issue), not whether
they are connected with the claim on the merits. There might be sufficient contacts to
apply the forum's longer limitation, but not to apply forum law on the merits.
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have an American admiralty court hear a case arising from the
seaman's relationship with the ship. The benefit test for fairness
probably would also be satisfied, since the shipowner received ma-
terial benefits from the seaman's services in United States ports
and from the port facilities themselves. 161
No full faith and credit question would arise in Bournias, since
no other state of the United States was involved . 62 The same case
could not arise with a state of the United States substituted for
Panama, since vessels of the sort involved in Bournias have national,
not state registry. But imagine a similar case involving a Florida
nonmaritime employee of a Florida employer claiming benefits
under a Florida employee benefit statute in an action brought in
New York. The action would, be barred by the Florida statute of
limitations, although permitted within the longer New York
period. Even if the due process tests could be met, applying the
New York limitation would violate full faith and credit. New York
has no interest in hearing the case; Florida has an interest in seeing
its policy of protecting its employers from stale labor claims applied
to the case. Since Florida has the overwhelming interest, full faith
and credit must be given to its short statute of limitations. Had the
New York statute been shorter than Florida's, New York could
apply it without denying full faith and credit to the Florida statute,
since New York would then be effectuating the administration of
justice in its courts by relieving them of stale claims. 163
(5) In Gillies v. Aeronaves de Mexico, S. A.,164 the court held on
nonconstitutional grounds that the forum should apply the shorter
foreign statute of limitations in an action against the Mexican na-
tional airline, brought by a former employee who was a forum
domiciliary and whose employment for the airline had placed him
in the forum. The action alleged wrongful discharge and sought
reparations which, under Mexican law, were measured by the
employee's wage rate and length of service. The Mexican cause of
action lapsed under Mexican law two months after the day of dis-
charge. It seems clear that the due process power and fairness tests
could be met if the forum applied its own longer statute of limita-
161 The analysis does not rely on the Dick distinction between foreign statutory limita-
tions and foreign contractual limitations. That distinction is of dubious current signifi-
cance. See note 48 supra.
162 Professor Martin would apparently ap ly a full faith and credit test, by analogy, to
this as well as to other international conflicts cases. See Martin, supra note 1, at 196, 223.
163 Accord, Martin, supra note 1, at 223.
164 468 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 931 (1973).
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tions. Suppose, however, that an American employee brings an
action against an American employer under a statute (identical to
the Mexican statute) of the state of the employer's principal place
of business. Suppose also that no similar right of action exists
under forum law, although the forum has a general statute of
limitations which would not bar the action. Because the two-month
limitation period specifically qualifies a special right uniquely
created for a limited class of persons, the forum should be re-
quired by full faith and credit to apply it. It would grossly distort
the nondivisible statutory scheme to enforce the statutory right
without applying the limitation. 65 If the other state's legislative
scheme had not been so clearly an integrated whole, or if the
forum had an employee-protection scheme substantially the same
as the other state's, there would be no full faith and credit
problem.' 66
(6) Illinois has used the public policy escape device to decline
to hear suits brought against insurance companies under the Wis-
consin direct-action statute, when the claims stem from Wisconsin
accidents. 167 Full faith and credit objections were rejected in those
cases, but at least one commentator has argued that Illinois was
constitutionally required to hear the direct-action claims.1 68 It
seems clear, however, that Illinois was not denying a forum in the
constitutionally relevant sense. Illinois would hear claims against
tortfeasors arising out of Wisconsin accidents, absent a lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction or a legitimate application of forum non conve-
niens. Since either of the latter two grounds for dismissal would be
permissible under recognized standards of judicial administration,
the only arguable affront to Wisconsin is the failure to recognize
its direct-action remedy. That is not sufficient to breach the full
faith and credit outer barrier when Illinois does not bar tort actions
arising from the Wisconsin occurrences. Neither Hughes nor any
reasonable extension of it requires a state to honor a sister state's
peculiar form of action or remedy, even if it would impose no
165 Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 912 (1963) presented a different situation. There the court ostensibly permitted suit
under the Massachusetts wrongful death act, but did not apply the Massachusetts damage
limitation or its culpability standard for measurement of damages. In effect, the court
simply applied forum (New York) law, as it was constitutionally entitled to do on the facts.
166 Under these facts, the forum could satisfy due process as well as full faith and
credit objections if it simply applied its own employee-protection scheme.
1 See Reishus v. Maryland Cas. Co., 411 F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 1969); Marchlik v.
Coronet Ins. Co., 40 Ill. 2d 327, 239 N.E.2d 799 (1968).
168 Leathers, supra note 103, at 14-16.
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burden, as long as the forum provides its own nondiscriminatory
form of action or remedy.
(7) In Rosenthal v. Warren,'169 a New Yorker had gone to a
Boston hospital for an operation by a well-known Boston surgeon.
The hospital drew about eight percent of its patients from New
York and about one-third from outside Massachusetts. When the
New York patient died shortly after surgery, his New York sur-
vivors brought a wrongful death action against the surgeon and
hospital in a New York federal district court. The defendants in-
terposed an affirmative defense based on the Massachusetts
wrongful death damage limitation in force at the time of the opera-
tion. A partial summary judgment striking the defense was af-
firmed. In choosing New York law, the court relied on New York's
interest, which it said clearly outweighed the "anachronistic" Mas-
sachusetts damage limitation, and gave some weight to the ex-
trater.ritorial drawing power of the Boston surgeon and hospital.
Professor Martin considers the Rosenthal result unconstitu-
tional on full faith and credit grounds, finding that Massachusetts'
interest in protecting the surgeon and hospital through its damage
limitation outweighed New York's interest in protecting New York-
ers through its unlimited damage rule.170 Since he recognizes the
interests of both states, his balance is struck on the basis of the
Massachusetts contacts. At the outset, one wonders why the policies
served by full faith and credit demand choice of Massachusetts law
based on its contacts (as distinguished from the Massachusetts
interest in protecting its doctor and hospital) in a true conflict sit-
uation. But since Massachusetts not only had a clear interest in ap-
plying its protective policy, but also was the locus of everything
seemingly relevant to liability, application of New York's unlim-
ited recovery law might be considered an intolerable slap in the
face-just the sort of gratuitous insult the full faith and credit
clause is designed to avoid. It is difficult, however, to ascertain
when a combination of state interest and contacts will justifiably
produce such indignation; in fact, given the steadily receding (now
extinct) Massachusetts damage limitation, the affront to Massa-
chusetts may not have been serious in Rosenthal.
The due process clause provides a more penetrating constitu-
tional objection to Rosenthal. If state law should not reach out to
supply a rule of decision without something to justify that exercise
169 475 F.2d 438 (2d Gir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973).
170 Martin, supra note 1, at 226-27.
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of power (even in the absence of a gratuitous insult to another
state), application of New York law in Rosenthal seems unjustified.
Contacts become significant here, not because all of them were in
Massachusetts, but because none were in New York. New York's
only possible justification for applying its law rested on the
worldwide reputation of the surgeon and the hospital's record of
attracting patients from New York and elsewhere.' 17  Although
those facts might indicate that the defendants received some ben-
efits from New York (satisfying the due process fairness test), it is
very doubtful that they establish a sufficient relationship with New
York to justify the exercise of power inherent in application of
New York law. The power rationale does not focus on the concerns
of individual parties (as the fairness rationale does) nor on the
specific concerns of other states (as full faith and credit does), but
on the outer limits of state acquisitiveness-in the choice-of-law
context, acquisitiveness regarding competence to supply a rule of
decision. With no greater relationship between the defendants and
New York than their unadvertised drawing power in the state, New
York's proper reach probably had been exceeded. 17 2
(8) The California Supreme Court held in People v. One 1953
Ford Victoria' 73 that an unusual California forfeiture law would not
be applied against a Texas automobile mortgagee who had made a
secured automobile loan in Texas in compliance with Texas legal
requirements. The California statute required that the interest of a
mortgagee would be forfeited if no character check of the mort-
gagor had been made at the time of the loan, and if the car were
later seized for unlawfully transporting narcotics. Texas law did
not impose an equivalent condition. The Texas mortgagee had
inserted a provision in the mortgage prohibiting the mortgagor
from removing the car from the county without the written con-
sent of the mortgagee. Without consent, the mortgagor drove the
car to California and was caught there transporting marijuana.
" Apparently the hospital also raised funds in New York and elsewhere. 475 F.2d at
444. This seems too unrelated to the issue or to the circumstances of the case to be rele-
vant.
172 In Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969),
New York applied its own law to permit a New York automobile guest to recover from a
New York host, although the accident and all the physical contacts occurred in Michigan.
The domicile of the defendant was an adequate relationship with the forum to satisfy the
power requirement. Since no material benefits were sought by the defendant in operating
her car, the fairness test would require that she be aware of her New York relationship.
Clearly she would have been.
173 48 Cal. 2d 595, 311 P.2d 480 (1957).
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Although the court in Ford Victoria did not rest its decision on
constitutional grounds, it is likely that any other result would have
violated the due process .clause. There was a sufficient contact with
California-the marijuana was transported there-but it is ques-
tionable whether the Texas mortgagee could reasonably have ex-
pected to derive any material benefit from California sources. If
the mortgagee could not reasonably have foreseen that the car
would be driven to California and payments on the loan would be
made from California, the benefit test would not be met. In any
event, the harshness of the unique California forfeiture statute
would have been so disproportionate to any anticipated California
benefit that it would have been manifestly unfair to apply it against
the Texas mortgagee.'7 4
(9) Contrast Bernkrant v. Fowler,17 5 another California case ap-
plying nonforum law. One Granrud allegedly made an oral prom-
ise in Nevada to draft a will forgiving a debt owed by three Ne-
vadans. Granrud may have been a Nevada resident when he made
the promise, but he later died a resident and domiciliary of
California. His will did not forgive the debt. Under California law
the oral promise was unenforceable because of the statute of
frauds; it was enforceable under Nevada law. The California Su-
preme Court applied Nevada law, though not on constitutional
grounds.' 6
Even if Granrud had clearly been a Nevada resident when he
made the promise, California could have applied its own law. The
power test was met because Granrud was a California domiciliary
at the time of his death (the time at which the promise was to be
executed). In terms of fairness, the promisees reasonably could
have expected that a Nevada promisor might move to another state
(especially adjacent California) from which the eventual benefit
would arise upon his death. It is irrelevant that the benefit would
not result from application of California law if the promisor failed
to make the promised will. It would be fair to apply even the
adverse California law if the promisees could reasonably have an-
174 The California statute (CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 11620) was repealed
shortly after the Ford Victoria decision. See CAL. STATS. 1959, c. 2085, § 5, at 4817. The
statute's application in that case would not have denied full faith and credit to Texas law,
since California's interest in applying its law would not have been overwhelmed by Texas's
interest, and none of the other full faith and credit criteria would have applied.
175 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961).
176 The court considered the case on the basis of "the reasonable expectations of the
parties and the policy of the statute of frauds." 55 Cal. 2d 588, 597, 360 P.2d 906, 910, 12
Cal. Rptr. 266, 270 (1961).
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ticipated that their debt would be forgiven by a person who might
live in California when his last will would take effect. If they then
failed to insure that the promise was in a form enforceable under
California law, the unfavorable result (should California choose to
apply its own law) would not rise to a due process violation.' 7 7
(10) A similar due process case, but without the "benefit" ele-
ment, is Young v. Masci.178 A New Jersey resident lent his au-
tomobile in New Jersey, apparently with the tacit understanding
that the car could be taken to New York. The borrower did drive it
to New York, and negligently injured a New Yorker. New York
statutory law made the owner liable under such circumstances, but
New Jersey did not. The New Jersey court applied the New York
statute, and the United States Supreme Court affirmed. Clearly the
contact test was met, since the accident occurred in New York.
Although the New Jersey owner did not enter into the transaction
expecting any material benefit, he obviously could have foreseen
that an accident might occur in New York, since he gave at least
tacit permission to take the car there. Thus, both due process tests
were met.
A full faith and credit problem would not be involved when the
New Jersey court applied the only plausibly applicable law other
than its own, since full faith and credit policy is not concerned with
whatever gratuitous insult a state may deal itself by failing to apply
its own law. Had the case involved a New York forum applying
New York law, the due process issue would have remained the
same and no full faith and credit violation would have resulted
because of New York's strong interest in applying its owner liability
statute to compensate the injured New Yorker.179
" Nor would a full faith and credit violation arise, for the same reasons as in Ford
Victoria. See note 174 supra.
.78 289 U.S. 253 (1933).
179 Cf. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962). An action was brought in a federal
district court in Oklahoma, arising out of a fatal crash in Missouri of a scheduled flight
from Oklahoma to New York. The plaintiffs alleged that the Federal Aviation Agency had
failed to enforce its aircraft maintenance rules at the airline's overhaul depot in Oklahoma.
The Court interpreted the Federal Tort Claims Act in such a way that the Oklahoma place-
of-wrong connecting factor was used, resulting in choice of Missouri law (which contained
a wrongful death damage limitation benefiting the Government). Since the crash occurred
in Missouri, the due process power rationale would not pose a problem. There is no indi-
cation that the government expected any material benefit from the flight, so the reasonably
foreseeable contact test should be used to assess fairness. One should foresee that an air-
craft might crash in any state on or near its normal flight pattern. Missouri would be such
a state on a regularly scheduled Oklahoma-to-New York flight. Consequently due process
would not pose a problem.
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(11) A California Corporations Code provision'8" mandates
choice of California law on a variety of internal corporate matters
involving certain foreign corporations if the average of the prop-
erty, payroll, and sales factors allocated to California for state tax
purposes exceeds fifty percent for the previous year, and if more
than half of the outstanding voting stock is held by Californians.' 81
The statute covers election and removal of directors, internal liabil-
ity of directors, and shareholders' rights, including cumulative vot-
ing and rights of inspection. If this provision is applied to require a
Delaware corporation meeting the California statutory conditions
to adopt cumulative voting under California law (although Dela-
ware law makes cumulative voting optional), would California
deny full faith and credit to Delaware law?
California might violate two full faith and credit standards: the
overwhelming interest standard, and the standard that requires a
court to apply a bellwether state's law when there is an overwhelm-
ing reason to decide similar claims according to one legal system. 82
The overwhelming interest objection is easily dismissed, because
the California provision is framed to apply only to foreign corpora-
tions centered in California. Therefore, one cannot seriously argue
that Delaware (or any other state) would have an overwhelmingly
greater interest than California in applying its law.
The more difficult question is whether there is an overwhelm-
ing reason to decide the cumulative voting rights of all stock-
holders under one legal system, and if so, whether a state other
than California is clearly the bellwether. It seems essential that
voting rights of all stockholders in a single corporation be uniform.
Unfairness and considerable confusion would result if some stock-
holders, relying on California law, could cumulate their votes while
those in other states either could not do so or are uncertain of their
rights. This has long been recognized under traditional choice-of-
law rules, which looked to the state of incorporation not only as the
state with the presumed power to regulate internal corporate mat-
Nor would full faith and credit be an impediment on the facts of the case, since the
only choice was between Oklahoma (forum) law and Missouri law, with forum law losing
out. See note 111 supra. Arguably, also, the requirement that full faith and credit "be given
in each State" to the public acts of every other state, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, would not
apply when the choice-of-law rule is in a federal statute such as the Tort Claims Act.
180 CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West Supp. 1976). The provision became effective on
Jan. 1, 1977). Id.
181 The statutory choice of California law does not apply to corporations listed on the
New York or American Stock Exchange. Id. § 2115(e).
182 See Part II D supra.
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ters, but as a clearly identifiable bellwether state. 183 The "state of
incorporation" connecting factor produced uniform, predictable
results in most cases.
It has been argued that the need for uniformity concerning
stockholders' voting rights dictates that the state-of-incorporation
rule should be required under full faith and credit, unless another
state is its principal place of business and the situs of all, or nearly
all, its activities.' 84 Under that test, applying California law in the
well-known Western Airlines case 8 5 would deny full faith and credit
to the law of the state of incorporation. 86 Furthermore, applying
California law to a Delaware corporation having only the California
contacts required by the new statute would also be unconstitu-
tional.
It is not clear why the state of incorporation must be the bell-
wether state when the business contacts and voting stockholders
are centered in another state, as required by the new California
Code provision. A single bellwether is required; nothing inherent
in the full faith and credit policies of federalism would prevent a
state clearly having the greatest interest in a corporation and in the
rights of its stockholders from displacing the state where the incor-
porators chose to file the incorporation papers. Logically, those
policies call for such a result, since a state meeting the conditions
set forth in the new California Code-over half of the combined
property, payroll, and sales, plus over half of the stockholders
-may well have the overwhelming interest in regulating such mat-
ters as stockholder voting rights.
There are two possible rebuttals: First, the need for a bell-
wether implies the overriding need for certainty in determining
which state will serve that function. The state-of-incorporation rule
provides that certainty. Without it there will be borderline cases,
since there is no guarantee that every state following California's
lead will be as scrupulous in limiting its grasp to corporations in
which it obviously has the overwhelming interest, and in some cases
one might argue whether even the California test is met. Second,
183 Reese & Kaufman, The Law Governing Corporate Affairs: Choice of Law and the Impact
of Full Faith and Credit, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1124-27 (1958).
1841d. at 1141.
185 Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1961)
(applied then-existing California law to block a change in articles of a Delaware corpora-
tion that would have eliminated cumulative voting). More than half of Western's traffic was
generated in California, sixty percent of its wages were paid there, and thirty percent of
its stockholders were Californians. It did no business in Delaware.
186 See Reese & Kaufman, supra note 183, at 1144.
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even if some focus other than state of incorporation makes sense
and avoids serious damage to principles of certainty, an instant
switch to the new approach by all states will not occur. In the long
interim, chaos will prevail with some states (including Delaware)
looking to the state of incorporation and some looking to the state
where the business and stockholder contacts are predominant.
Thus it would arguably be better to retain the tried and true rule,
and to solidify it under the full faith and credit clause.
There are a number of persuasive responses. First, even the
supporters of a constitutionally required state-of-incorporation
rule concede that it might not be required when virtually all the
business is done in another state. Once one concedes that such an
overwhelmingly interested state could be the bellwether, there is no
reason to distinguish the case in which the corporation does not do
all its business in one state, if a single state clearly has a greater
interest than any other in regulating internal corporate affairs.
Second, the loss of certainty is insubstantial in an approach that
permits use of a non-incorporation state as the rulemaker only
when that state can demonstrate its clearly greatest interest by a
mechanically applied formula such as the dual-factor formula in
the California Code. Third, there is little reason to cling to a one-
dimensional bellwether (serving only the policy of certainty) when
a new approach could serve other policies as well-particularly
when it could give rulemaking authority regarding internal matters
to the state with the greatest interest in resolving such matters.
Moreover, it is doubtful that other states following California's ap-
proach will unjustifiably assert themselves to be the preponderantly
interested state; if they do, the Supreme Court could thwart the
effort by requiring that they give full faith and credit to the law of
the overwhelmingly interested state, or if none, to the law of the
state of incorporation.
Finally, although there would indeed be some uncertainty dur-
ing any transition from rigid deference to the state of incorpora-
tion to the new regime, it is doubtful that serious problems would
arise with any frequency. Most questions would be resolved simply,
without litigation, by complying with the law of the overwhelmingly
interested state, if such a state exists, and if it has asserted the
authority to apply its law. If litigation occurs, it will often be in the
courts of that state, whose judgments will be entitled to full faith
and credit elsewhere as to the parties and those in privity with
them. Even if the original litigation occurs elsewhere, many courts
have departed from traditional, rigid choice-of-law rules. They
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should be receptive to application of the law of the state having the
overwhelming interest in resolving internal corporate affairs. If, on
the particular facts, an overwhelmingly interested state is involved,
then full faith and credit policies probably require this result. 187
In sum, the California provision does not appear to violate the
full faith and credit clause, and may in fact express a right be-
stowed by that clause.
(12) Finally, let us consider the choice-of-law aspect of Hanson
v. Denckla.18 8 Dora Donner, then a Pennsylvania domiciliary,
created a revocable inter vivos trust with a Delaware corporate
trustee. The corpus consisted of stocks, bonds, and notes. Mrs.
Donner reserved the income for life, with the remainder to be paid
as she might appoint by deed or will. She retained the right to
change trustees, and many of the trustee's powers could be exer-
cised only with the consent of a trust advisor named by her. A few
days after creating the trust, she exercised the power of appoint-
ment, which she amended in 1939. Mrs. Donner later moved to
Florida, where in 1949 she revoked her earlier exercises of the
power and substituted a new appointment calling for payment at
her death of $200,000 to each of two Delaware trusts previously
created by one of her daughters, Mrs. Hanson, for Mrs. Hanson's
children, and disposed of the remaining trust assets' 8 9 according to
the residuary clause of the will that Mrs. Donner executed sepa-
rately the same day. The will left the residue to two other daugh-
ters and named Mrs. Hanson as the executrix. When Mrs. Donner
died, the two other daughters petitioned a Florida chancery court
for a decree declaring that the appointments to Mrs. Hanson's two
Delaware trusts were invalid and that the $400,000 ostensibly ap-
pointed to those trusts fell into the residue.
'" See text accompanying notes 129-32 supra. The Delaware General Corporation
Law, DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 121(b) (1975), provides: "Every corporation shall be governed by
the provisions and be subject to the restrictions and liabilities contained in this chapter."
This might be construed as a choice of Delaware statutory law for the internal affairs of a
Delaware corporation. A Delaware court would be required to apply a Delaware statutory
choice of law, unless it would be unconstitutional to do so. As I have argued, it would be un-
constitutional to apply Delaware law when California (or some other state) overwhelmingly
has the greatest interest. Another alternative would be to construe the quoted Delaware
provision simply to mean that no Delaware corporation is governed (insofar as it is gov-
erned at all by Delaware law) by any other chapter of the Delaware Code. Of course, courts
outside Delaware would not have to apply the Delaware statute to a California-centered cor-
poration unless (contrary to the argument in the text) full faith and credit requires choice
of the law of the state of incorporation.
188 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
1'89 They were worth more than $1,000,000. Id. at 239.
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The chancery court held that it lacked jurisdiction over both
Mrs. Donner's and Mrs. Hanson's Delaware trustees, since they had
not been personally served and the trust corpus in each instance
was in Delaware. It nevertheless decided that the trustees were not
indispensable parties, and held that the $400,000 passed into the
residue because Mrs. Donner's exercise of the power of appoint-
ment in Florida was testamentary and had not met the require-
ments of the Florida statute of wills. 190 In the meantime, the ex-
ecutrix had initiated a parallel declaratory judgment action in
Delaware. After the Florida decree had been entered, the Flor-
ida residuary legatees unsuccessfully urged that the Florida judg-
ment was res judicata in the Delaware proceedings. The Delaware
chancellor held that the Donner trust and the exercise of the
power of appointment were valid under Delaware law.
Meanwhile, back in Florida, an appeal was taken to the Florida
Supreme Court. The executrix, who had prevailed in the Delaware
trial court, did not assert that full faith and credit was owed to the
Delaware decree. The Florida Supreme Court held that valid juris-
diction in Florida had been obtained by constructive service on the
Delaware trustees, and that the issue on the merits was the validity
of the Donner trust-which depended on whether it had substance
as an inter vivos transfer or whether the settlor's reserved rights
were such that it should be treated as an attempted testamentary
disposition subject to the applicable statute of wills.191 On the
choice-of-law question, it held that Florida law should determine
the trust's validity because
the last effective acts, if any there were, of the settlor to establish
remainder interests under the trust were accomplished while she
was a Florida domiciliary, and we consider the last powers of
appointment as a republication of the original trust instrument,
or as if the trust instrument had been executed while the settlor
was domiciled in Florida. 192
190 See Hanson v. Denckla, 100 So. 2d 378, 381 (Fla. 1956) (quotation from chancellor's
conclusions).
191 There was confusion in the United States Supreme Court as to whether the Florida
Supreme Court had treated the issue as the trust's validity or the validity of the exercise of
the power. The majority read the Florida opinion as dealing with the former, while the
dissent favored the latter interpretation. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 256 n.1
(1958). Although the Florida chancery court may have treated the validity of the exercise
of the power (see text accompanying note 190 supra), it is clear that the Florida Supreme
Court considered the issue to be the validity of the trust itself. See Hanson v. Denckla, 100
So. 2d 378, 382-85 (Fla. 1956).
192 100 So. 2d at 382.
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Under the Florida statute of wills, the trust was invalid.
At that point the Delaware litigation had not run its course.
After the Florida Supreme Court's decision, the Delaware Supreme
Court affirmed the Delaware chancellor, holding that Delaware law
determined the validity of the Donner trust, that it was valid under
Delaware law, and that full faith and credit was not owed to the
Florida judgment because the Florida courts lacked jurisdiction
over both the Delaware trustees and the trust corpus. 193
Faced with this Florida-Delaware impasse, the United States
Supreme Court in a five-to-four decision reversed the Florida
judgment and held that Delaware was not required to give it full
faith and credit, because the Florida courts lacked in rem juris-
diction over the Donner trust and in personam jurisdiction over
the Delaware trustees. Moreover, the Delaware trustees were indis-
pensable parties under Florida law so the Florida courts could not
have proceeded validly without them. In so holding, the Court
opened itself to considerable scholarly criticism, both as to its due
process jurisdictional holding and as to its rather presumptuous
determination of the purely state law question regarding indis-
pensable parties.' 9
4
Under its own jurisprudence, the Court could have avoided
that criticism by upholding the Florida courts' jurisdiction, but
striking down the Florida Supreme Court's unconstitutional use of
Florida law to determine the validity of the Donner trust. That,
however, would have raised a thorny dilemma for the Court, but
for present purposes let us simply examine what it should have
held had it reached the choice-of-law point.'9 5
Florida probably could satisfy the two-pronged due process
test. The domicile of the settlor in Florida at the time of her death,
and the resulting administration of her estate there, would satisfy
the power test even though the issue was characterized as one of
validity of the inter vivos trust. The value and composition of the
assets in the estate depended on the resolution of that issue, thus
... Lewis v. Hanson, 36 Del. Ch. 235, 128 A.2d 819 (1957).
194 See, e.g., Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. Rav. 241,
243-44; Kurland, supra note 5, at 610-23. Professor Scott, who approved of the jurisdic-
tional holding in Hanson, had serious reservations about the propriety of determining the
indispensable party issue. Scott, Hanson v. Denckla, 72 HARV. L. REv. 695, 705 (1959).
"I The majority referred briefly to choice of law, saying that the Florida Supreme
Court's "republication" theory "may be justified" for choice-of-law purposes, but that it
would not provide a jurisdictional basis. 357 U.S. at 253. That is a lukewarm endorsement
at best; it sounds more like an avoidance of the issue. Mr. Justice Black and two others
thought that Florida could apply its own law. Id. at 258 (dissenting opinion).
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giving Florida an adequate nexus to apply its statute of wills. The
fairness test would also be met. The Delaware trustees were mere
stakeholders. The original trustee had nothing further to do after
it distributed the trust assets upon Mrs. Donner's death, and thus
would not be adversely affected by the choice of Florida law. The
trustee under Mrs. Hanson's trust did stand to lose commissions if
the appointed property fell into the Florida residue, but it is ques-
tionable whether its purely fiduciary interest should be considered
in applying the fairness test. The law everywhere treats the
pecuniary interest of a fiduciary as subordinate to all beneficial
interests, and those interests would not be treated unfairly in this
case because of the beneficiaries' expectation of gain to be derived
from Mrs. Donner, a Florida resident. In any event, when the
Hanson trustee entered the picture, almost all the potential ben-
eficiaries were Floridians. Any commissions the trustee might earn
derived from the services it would perform for those persons.
Full faith and credit, however, is another matter. In particular,
it seems that the Florida Supreme Court blatantly manipulated its
characterization of the situation to apply its own law.196 It did not
purport to follow interest analysis or to devise any new choice-of-
law method. Rather, it used the traditional process of characteriza-
tion and application of a connecting factor. That approach, of
course, remains widely used in matters involving trusts and wills.
Under it, if the issue was validity of the trust, 197 almost all au-
thorities would look to the validating law of the state where the
settlor intended the trust to be administered, unless-perhaps-the
settlor was trying to evade a strong protective policy for a desig-
nated class of persons in the common domicile of those persons
and the settlor.198 The Florida Court attempted to evade this by
the fiction of treating Mrs. Donner's exercise of the power of ap-
pointment after she had moved to Florida' 99 as a republication of
196 See category (A)(2) supra.
197 This is how the Florida court characterized the issue. 100 So.. 2d at 382 (1956).
198 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 270(b), comments c & e, at
164-65, 167-68 (1971); A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 244, at 643-44 (1962).
Compare Wyatt v. Fulrath, 16 N.Y.2d 169, 211 N.E.2d 637, 264 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1965), and
Hutchison v. Ross, 262 N.Y. 381, 187 N.E. 65 (1933), with Estate of Clark, 21 N.Y.2d 478,
236 N.E.2d 152, 288 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1968).
Under the first Restatement, current at the time of Hanson, the validity of the trust
would be determined by the law of the place where the transaction took place. RESTATE-
MENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 294(2) (1934). Mrs. Donner executed the trust agreement
in Delaware. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 247 n.1 7 (1958).
199 The court ultimately held that this exercise of the power did not have the effect of
transferring anything. 100 So. 2d at 385.
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the original trust instrument, so it could say the trust was created
by a Florida domiciliary. That bootstrapping exercise certainly put
the Florida Supreme Court in a class with the Georgia Supreme
Court in Yates 200 as a manipulator of choice-of-law rules. 20 ' The
manipulation is made more evident by the fact that Florida would
not fit within the arguable exception to choice of Delaware law
even if Mrs. Donner and her daughters had been Florida
domiciliaries all along, since the Florida law applied by the court
was simply the statute of wills requiring certain formalities of ex-
ecution, not a specific statutory policy protecting a favored class of
Floridians. 2
It is also arguable that there was an overwhelming reason to
decide all questions of the validity of the trust according to one
legal system, and that the state of trust administration provided the
clear bellwether.20 3 Even though fewer people may be involved
than in the usual case of questions involving internal corporate
affairs, the need for uniformity in deciding the validity of interests
in a trust seems at least as compelling as in the corporate situation.
But as in that situation, it does not necessarily follow that the "con-
stitutive state" (state of incorporation or state of trust administra-
tion) will be the bellwether, when all or a significant majority of
200 John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936). See text accompany-
ing note 84 supra.
201 The commentators are virtually unanimous that the Florida Court should have ap-
plied Delaware law, though most of them do not address the constitutional choice-of-law
question. See Briggs, Jurisdiction by Statute, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 223, 243 (1963) (Florida was
"torturing the import of the exercise of the power of appointment by calling it a
'republication' "); Cleary, The Length of the Long Arm, 9 J. PuB. L. 293, 296 (1960); Kurland,
supra note 194, at 620; Scott, supra note 194, at 699-700; von Mehren & Trautman, Juris-
diction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1175 (1966) (Florida's
choice of its own law was "extreme and virtually unsupportable").
202 Even if the issue were characterized as validity of the exercise of the power, it
would probably require a fiction to bring it within Florida law under the Florida choice-of-
law approach. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 274 (1971), states that the
formalities required to exercise a power over moveables in an inter vivos trust are valid if
they comply with the law that determines validity of the trust-in this case, Delaware law
under § 270(b). Under the first Restatement, validity of the power's exercise would be
governed by Delaware law at least as to the bonds and notes (because the rights would be
"embodied in the documents" and the documents were held by the trustee in Delaware).
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 262 (1934); cf. id. § 286. The connecting factor for
the appointment of corporate stock held by the trust may have been the state of incor-
poration. Id. § 182. But see id. § 294, comment f, and Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 247
n.16 (1958), suggesting that the stocks should be treated the same as the bonds and notes.
In any event, Delaware law would apply as to any Delaware corporation; it is highly un-
likely that many Florida corporations were represented in the trust corpus.
203 See category (B)(2) supra.
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those beneficially interested are domiciled in one other state. That
was the case in Hanson, but only because some years after the trust
was established the beneficiaries had moved to Florida. If the
specific issue was validity of the trust itself, as characterized by the
Florida Supreme Court, the bellwether test should apply as of the
time the trust was created. If so, Florida denied full faith and
credit to Delaware law under this standard as well as under the
"grossly manipulative characterization" standard.
It might also be argued (tenuously) that Florida denied full
faith and credit to Delaware law because of Delaware's overwhelm-
ing interest in overseeing the proper distribution of the trust
assets. 20 4 Delaware certainly has an interest in attracting trust assets
and protecting its trusts and trustees through its liberal policy of
upholding inter vivos trusts despite retention of income rights and
considerable powers by settlors. But that interest is not so over-
whelming by comparison with the interests of other states where
the settlors and/or beneficiaries may reside to require all states to
bow to it. Once again, the test becomes too unpredictable as a
constitutional restriction on choice of law unless it is strictly re-
served for the lopsided case.
To summarize, it appears that Florida denied full faith and
credit to Delaware law, both because it evaded the choice of
Delaware law mandated by faithful application of its professed
choice-of-law method, and because it failed to look to Delaware
as the clear bellwether for determining validity of the trust. Sup-
pose, however, that Delaware were not considered the clear bell-
wether, because of the ultimate concentration in Florida of the
settlor and major beneficiaries. Would Florida's tortured "repub-
lication" theory still result in a denial of full faith and credit to
Delaware law?
If Florida had simply applied interest analysis, it might have
applied its own law without any manipulation. It presumably could
find an interest in effectuating the policy of its statute of wills,
which protected the estates of its domiciliaries from doubtful
claims based on instruments not executed with sufficient formality
either to demonstrate the decedent's seriousness of purpose or to
establish the authenticity of the decedent's signature. That seems
farfetched on the Hanson facts, but statutes of wills are typically
204 See category (B)(1) supra. This appears to be the argument in Briggs, supra note
201, at 246-49, 257, although it is not clear whether he considers this a due process or full
faith and credit matter.
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applied woodenly, and Florida's interpretation of its own statute of
wills would be its own concern. The fact that Mrs. Donner (and
presumably some or all of her daughters) moved to Florida after
the trust was created poses additional problems for interest
analysis, but probably should not defeat Florida's assertion of an
interest; Mrs. Donner obviously was not forum shopping and the
Florida interest in its decedents' estates applies to all who die
domiciled there, even if they previously had executed trust instru-
ments while domiciled elsewhere.
But the fact that Florida could have applied its own law under
interest analysis should not change the full faith and credit result.
Florida did not use interest analysis. Instead, it used a traditional
characterization-connecting factor approach, and used it in such a
way as to give another state a gratuitous slap in the face. It is the
insult that matters. Full faith and credit tries to avoid that result,
because it is concerned with the maintenance of interstate harmony
in a federal system. It does not matter that the Florida Supreme
Court indicated it favored a "domicile of the settlor" connecting
factor, 20 5 since that appears simply to have been an inseparable
part of the effort to avoid Delaware law. The insult remains.
If the full faith and credit argument as to choice of law is so
compelling, why did the Supreme Court elect instead to reverse the
Florida decision on rather tenuous jurisdictional grounds coupled
with an intrusion into Florida law regarding indispensable parties?
The answer must be that it seemed the lesser of two dilemmas. The
majority had little sympathy for the judicial gymnastics by which
the Florida Supreme Court had managed- to reach all the parties
and the issues, or for the prevailing parties in the Florida
proceedings. 0 6 Mrs. Hanson had not argued in Florida that full
faith and credit was owed to Delaware law.20 7 By deciding the
205 See Hanson v. Denckla, 100 So. 2d 378, 382 (Fla. 1956).
206 It was not essential to a determination of the legal issues to point out, as the major-
ity did, that the residuary legatees-the Florida victors-had already received over
$500,000 each under Mrs. Donner's will, and sought to divide the remaining $400,000
appointed to their nephews. See 357 U.S. at 240.
207 Mrs. Hanson did not argue that full faith and credit was owed to the Delaware
chancery decree until she moved for a rehearing after the Florida Supreme Court's deci-
sion. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 242-43 (1958). This may have been due to her
uncertainty as to the finality of a Delaware chancery decree pending its appeal. Review of
such a decree in Delaware covers both fact and law, and one post-Hanson case has even
characterized this appeal as a limited form of rehearing. Nardo v. Nardo, 58 Del. 400, 410,
209 A.2d 905, 911 (1965). See also Sohland v. Baker, 15 Del. Ch. 431, 444-45, 141 A. 277,
283 (1927).
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matter on jurisdictional grounds, the Court avoided deciding
whether a right intended primarily to protect the interests of
federalism was waived by a private party at some time before direct
review was completed.2 °8
In addition, had the Court held that the Florida courts had
jurisdiction but that they had denied full faith and credit to Dela-
ware law, it would have faced the question of whether Delaware
had failed to give full faith and credit to the constitutionally erro-
neous Florida determination. 20 9
If the Court held that full faith and credit was not owed to a
sister state judgment based on an unconstitutional choice of law,
second-guessing and retaliation among states would have been the
result. Presumably it would not wish to do that.2 10 But that would
necessitate a reversal of the Delaware Supreme Court's decision
applying Delaware law in favor of Mrs. Hanson as a denial of full
faith and credit to the Florida judgment, unless the Supreme Court
held that the reviewable federal question raised by the Florida
judgment created a narrow exception-so long as the possibility of
direct review remained open-to the respect normally demanded
of final determinations by sister states. Whether such an exception
is desirable is not an easy question. 211 If such an exception were
not found, the reversal of the Delaware determination applying
208 Cases involving alleged denials of full faith and credit to judgments indicate that a
waiver may result from failure to pursue all avenues of appellate review. See Ginsburg,
Judgments in Search of Full Faith and Credit: The Last-in-Time Rule for Conflicting Judgments, 82
HARV. L. REv. 798, 802-11 (1969). Query if a waiver of a right based on a fundamental
federal policy could exist while the avenues remain open?
209 The Court would have had to face this question, since the Delaware case was be-
fore it.
210 Cf. Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402 (1952); Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S.
66 (1939) (required full faith and credit to judgments that have denied full faith and credit
to prior judgments). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAwS § 114, comment
a at 329-30 (1971).
211 The decision of the Florida Supreme Court antedated the Delaware Supreme
Court's decision. Full faith and credit would be owed to the Florida determination (which
we now assume to have been free from jurisdictional defect) if the unconstitutional choice
of Florida law or the possibility of the United States Supreme Court review did not stand
in the way. The Delaware Supreme Court's decision was dated Jan. 14, 1957, but United
States Supreme Court review of the Florida decision was not sought until April 17, 1957.
See 25 U.S.L.W. 3322 (1957). Cases holding that full faith and credit is due to judgments
that may have themselves denied full faith and credit to earlier judgments (see note 210
supra) have placed some emphasis on lack of diligence by the challenging party in pursuing
all direct appellate remedies in the second proceeding. See Ginsburg, supra note 208, at
802-11, 831-32. This may suggest a relaxation while the direct remedies are diligently
being pursued, but does it relieve the full faith and credit obligation while a further direct
remedy (United States Supreme Court review) is possible but has not yet been sought?
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Delaware law would be accompanied by a reversal of the Florida
determination because it did not apply Delaware law (presumably
with an instruction to the Florida courts to do what the Delaware
courts improperly did)-an apparent anomaly that may have made
the jurisdictional escape look attractive indeed. Moreover, the
practical effect of reversing the Florida judgment on jurisdic-
tional grounds and deciding that the trustees were indispensable
parties (while affirming the Delaware judgment) was exactly the
same as a determination that Delaware law had to be chosen, since
the Florida courts on remand were obliged to give full faith and
credit to the now-final Delaware judgment applying Delaware
law. 2 12 Perhaps the Court's madness had a method after all.
CONCLUSION
Due process and full faith and credit restrictions on choice of
law necessarily leave considerable leeway for choice of forum law.
But they do supply some meaningful limitations which can be
defined with enough specificity to have predictive force for future
cases. These two constitutional clauses serve interrelated but dis-
tinguishable purposes in choice of law: Due process combines a
check on power excesses by individual states with a regard for
fundamental fairness to those who stand to lose by the exercise of
the power to choose the rule supplied by a given legal system, while
full faith and credit looks after the functional legal requirements of
a nonunitary (federal) national framework in which states must
coexist in relative harmony. It is not always easy, of course, to
determine when either clause should be applied to strike down a
particular choice of law, but the difficulties can be relieved some-
what by the formulation and testing of standards reflecting the
purposes of the clauses as they have been applied by the Supreme
Court. A vague balancing standard is inadequate for the job.
Hopefully, the more detailed standards I have proposed will pro-
vide a better alternative.
212 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 261 (1958) (dissenting opinion). Of course,
questions of nonfinality of the Delaware chancery decree were moot, and it is difficult to
imagine that any waiver of the right to rely on that decree would extend to the Delaware
Supreme Court's judgment as affirmed by the United States Supreme Court.
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